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IMPACT EVALUATION UNDER THE BANNER OF THE CROSS: 
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO THE EVALUATION OF  
POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMS 
 
Stephen M. Pitts, SJ 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis proposes normative criteria of individual and social welfare to 
evaluate poverty alleviation programs. Since World War II, both governments and NGOs 
have implemented a variety of development projects to address the poverty of individuals 
and groups around the world. The emerging field of impact evaluation applies a 
methodology borrowed from clinical drug trials to measure the effect of these projects on 
the populations that they serve. Sixty years of the history of development reveal that 
despite the sophistication of the statistical techniques, the field cannot offer basic 
guidance on what outcomes to measure.  
In response, this thesis develops a set of criteria that integrates resources from 
development economics, Catholic Social Teaching, the capability approach of Martha 
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, and the political philosophy of John Rawls. First, it 
proposes five criteria of individual welfare that these fields all share: human dignity, 
political rights, socio-economic rights, internal goods, and agency. Next, it proposes five 
criteria of social welfare by integrating complementary themes from different fields: 
social welfare and the common good, solidarity and social capital, subsidiarity and small-
scale development, extractive institutions and mutual relationships, and authentic 
development as growth in vulnerability.  
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Finally, it applies these criteria to a case study of indigenous coffee growers in 
Chiapas, Mexico to compare the effects of Mexican government social programs, the fair 
trade coffee movement, and the value chain reform proposed by the Batsil Maya coffee 
cooperative that is sponsored by the Jesuit mission of Bachajón. Using these criteria, it 
judges that the work of Batsil Maya represents more authentic human development than 
the other two approaches because of 1) its integration with other mission projects that 
encompass all aspects of the lives of the Tseltales; 2) the way it addresses the structural 
forces responsible for Tseltal poverty; 3) the reciprocal relationships of mutuality that it 
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This thesis argues that traditional methods of impact evaluation in the discipline 
of development economics do not consider enough aspects of the reality of the poor to 
deeply address the structural problems at the heart of poverty. This introduction will use 
the case study of the Tseltal population in northeastern Chiapas as well as three potential 
approaches to alleviate their poverty in order to motivate this claim. The limited vantage 
point of impact evaluation leaves it unable to compare meaningfully these three 
interventions, which all address the symptoms of the Tseltales’ poverty but that vary in 
the extent to which they address the root causes of this same poverty. All of these 
interventions have received favorable evaluations from development practitioners. Yet 
they are very different in scope and approach, and each was evaluated using different 
criteria. The question emerges: could a single set of unified criteria provide a common 
vantage point to evaluate all of them? The thesis will propose a set of unified criteria in 
the form of aspects of individual and social welfare.  
Chapter 1 lays the groundwork. It will examine more deeply the structural factors 
at the heart of the Tseltales’ poverty, the history of impact evaluation, and two resources 
for these criteria: capability theory and Catholic Social Teaching. Chapters 2 and 3 will 
outline these criteria: five aspects of individual welfare and five aspects of social welfare. 
The conclusion will return to these three interventions and apply the criteria that the 
thesis has developed to them to deepen existing evaluations of the interventions and 
allow for these interventions to be compared to one another. It will label this new 




I. The Case 
   Our story begins with the Tseltal people. Despite the presence of one of 
Mexico’s most lucrative natural resources, this group of indigenous in the state of 
Chiapas suffers from the worst poverty in the country, even though the coffee they grow 
ranks as the second-most traded commodity in value in the world after oil. Official 
statistics from the Mexican Secretariat of Agriculture rank Mexico ninth among coffee-
producing nations in general and second among producers of organic coffee.1  In 2016, 
Mexico exported $334 million of raw coffee, around 1% of its total exports.2 The state of 
Chiapas in turn accounts for 35% of Mexican coffee production. 98% of its 181,000 
coffee farmers farm five hectares or less of land, qualifying as smallholder farmers.3  
These indigenous smallholder coffee farmers qualify as some of the poorest 
inhabitants of Mexico. 2016 figures from CONEVAL (The Center for National Welfare) 
classify 77% of the residents of Chiapas as living in poverty and 28% in extreme poverty, 
the highest percentage of any Mexican state. Moreover, Chiapas ties with neighboring 
Oaxaca as featuring the highest number of indigenous-speaking Mexicans, over one 
million apiece.4  Nationwide, of half a million coffee producers, 70% are indigenous. The 
																																																								
1 “Carpeta Delegaciones Convención Internal Del Cafe,” Sagarpa, last modified 2015, 
accessed March 20, 2017, 
http://www.sagarpa.gob.mx/Delegaciones/oaxaca/Documents/2015/Difusi%C3%B3n%2
0y%20Eventos/Convencion%20Internacional%20del%20Cafe%202015.pdf. 
2 “OEC - Coffee (HS92: 0901) Product Trade, Exporters and Importers,” accessed 
November 2, 2017, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/0901/. 
3 “Programa Institucional INCAFECH,” Programa Institucional INCAFECH, accessed 
November 2, 2017, 
http://www.planeacion.chiapas.gob.mx/planeacion/actualizacion_20151019/Programa%2
0Institucional%20INCAFECH%20validado.pdf. 
4 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), “México en cifras.Chiapas,” last 




question of why these indigenous cannot earn a decent living in this lucrative industry 
motivates this entire thesis.  Only a full understanding of the history of Chiapas will 
explain how an indigenous group that has grown corn and beans for centuries for 
communal consumption at present grows coffee as its primary cash crop to sell on the 
international market. Chapter 1 will examine these structural factors. For the moment, the 
introduction continues with three different approaches to alleviate their poverty.  
II. Three Approaches 
The poverty of smallholder agricultural producers is not unknown in the field of 
international development. The case of the Tseltal people provide a representative 
example, not only of the problem, but also of three possible solutions: fair trade, 
conditional cash transfers, and value chain reform. Each of these solutions targets a 
different piece of the issue. Moreover, all have received favorable evaluations by 
development practitioners, but the evaluations are based on different criteria and thus 
cannot be compared to one another. This section will summarize these three solutions in 
order to demonstrate the present fragmented state of impact evaluation.  
 
Fair Trade 
First, it turns to fair trade. Fridell traces the history of the fair trade movement 
since its reorientation in 1988 as a complement to globalization that enhances the ability 
of its partners in the developing world to participate in its opportunities.5 Briefly, fair 
trade seeks voluntary commitments from TNCs (transnational corporations) to pay a 
higher than market price for products produced by fair trade cooperatives. The “social 
																																																								
5	Gavin Fridell, Fair Trade Coffee: The Prospects and Pitfalls of Market-Driven Social 
Justice, 1st edition. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 52–100.	
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premiums” on the price funds the development of social and physical infrastructure. To 
receive fair trade certification, cooperatives must abide by minimum labor standards. 
Initially in Europe and then in the United States in the past 25 years, fair trade 
coffee has expanded both in consumer awareness and sales. Nevertheless, empirical 
evaluations have failed to show consistent gains from fair trade certification: a recent 
analysis of data from a Central American association of coffee cooperatives concluded 
that the extra costs of fair trade certification absorbed all of the rents6 the producers could 
have earned on the price premium.7  
Advocates of fair trade would argue that despite the lack of additional rents, the 
social premiums provide a positive externality in terms of the development of the 
communities in which the fair trade programs reside, but impact evaluations of fair trade 
programs have not measured these externalities. Fridell acknowledges the critique of fair 
trade that emphasizes how it fails to deal with the structural issue of the coffee market 
that chapter 1 will examine in more detail: the inability of smallholder producers to 
participate in a way other than selling raw materials at a price that they cannot control. 
Both of these points reveal the necessity to employ a broader set of criteria in impact 




6 In economics, rent means “a payment to the owner of an input beyond the minimum 
necessary for the factor to be supplied.” In colloquial terms, these payments refer to any 
profits beyond the price set by the interaction of supply and demand in the market. 
Jeffrey Perloff, Microeconomics: Theory and Applications with Calculus, 3rd edition. 
(Boston: Pearson, 2013), 766. 
7 Alain de Janvry, Craig McIntosh, and Elisabeth Sadoulet, “Fair Trade and Free Entry: 
Can a Disequilibrium Market Serve as a Development Tool?,” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 97, no. 3 (January 29, 2015): 567–573. 
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Conditional Cash Transfers 
The next approach deals with this structural issue from the side of the Mexican 
government as a result of an important political development in Chiapas in the 1990s. On 
January 1, 1994, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) began a two-year 
campaign against the Mexican government in Chiapas. This thesis cannot in detail 
examine the interaction of regional social grievances and outside pressure that instigated 
this conflict, but it bears noting the EZLN’s strong statements against neoliberalism and 
its substantial indigenous support, especially among groups in north-central Chiapas like 
the Tseltales, who had suffered from unjust land arrangements for the entire century and 
the collapse of the coffee market for nearly the entire previous decade. Chapter 1 will 
provide more detail on the history of land tenure in Chiapas. As a key result of the 
Zapatista revolution, the Mexican government purchased and returned 250,000 hectares 
of land to smallholder farmers (1994-97).8   
Around the same time, in 1993, the Mexican government began a series of 
subsidy payments (PROCAMPO) to smallholder farmers as a result of the impending 
adoption of NAFTA. The program describes itself as an “internationally accepted 
mechanism to transfer resources that helps people of low means who produce primarily 
for their own consumption without distorting the market.”9 The program provided 
subsidies, per hectare, up to five hectares. Though coffee does not appear on the list of 
																																																								
8 Daniel Villafuerte Solís, “Rural Chiapas Ten Years after the Armed Uprising of 1994: 
An Economic Overview,” in Rural Chiapas Ten Years after the Zapatista Uprising, ed. 
Sarah Washbrook (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 45–67. 




crops that it subsidizes, in practice the program provided additional income for Chiapas 
coffee producers, who grew corn for themselves. 
PROCAMPO has fared better in impact evaluations than fair trade programs. In 
the early 2000s, Sadoulet et. al. find an “income effect” of 1.5 to 2.5 times the value of 
the cash payments themselves because of access to land through the land reform and 
technical assistance in crop growing.10 Moreover, PROCAMPO represents a recent trend 
in international development: the use of cash payments to individuals who qualify under 
certain conditions (conditional cash transfers) instead of other market interventions. 
Despite the income effect, however, the question remains: does PROCAMPO just 
mitigate the symptoms of NAFTA or address the root causes?   
Another Mexican government social program stands out in this regard, 
PROGRESA, which since the early 1990s has given cash payments to families if they 
send their children to school and receive regular health checkups with the rationale that 
these investments in human capital will reap long-term benefits. The Mexican 
government designed PROGRESA with the help of development economists, who made 
available the public data sets that they used to evaluate it, and it has inspired a volume of 
literature as well as similar social programs around the world.11 
Nevertheless, recent literature on PROGRESA has shown “heterogeneous 
treatment effects”; in other words, program benefits vary depending on other factors and 
the combination of PROGRESA and PROCAMPO partially offsets the effect of either 
																																																								
10	Elisabeth Sadoulet, Alain de Janvry, and Benjamin Davis, “Cash Transfer Programs 
with Income Multipliers: PROCAMPO in Mexico,” World Development 29, no. 6 (June 1, 
2001): 1043–1056.	




one.12 These factors resemble the “conversion factors” of the capability approach that 
determine the ability of individuals to utilize an external resource.   
The Mexican government likely cannot do much more, however. Aside from the 
issue of land ownership, it is prevented by NAFTA from directly addressing the 
problematic features of the coffee market. It can only hope that a solution will emerge 
from within the market itself. Thus, criteria that only examine symptoms can judge 
PROCAMPO and PROGRESA as successes; but other criteria that take into account the 
structural factors at play would regard them as failures.  
   
Value Chain Reform 
As a third approach to the situation of the Tseltal coffee growers, this thesis 
proposes the Jesuit-sponsored coffee cooperative Ts’umbal Xitalha’ (or TX).13 TX 
addresses the structural problems with the coffee market in a deeper way than either fair 
trade or PROGRESA/PROCAMPO. Its history began when in response to the invitation 
of the local bishop, Jesuit missionaries arrived in 1959 to begin work with the Tseltal 
people.14 At first, they visited the people in their villages and organizing catechetical 
courses for them. In the wake of the Second Vatican Council, they translated the Bible 
and the liturgy into the local language and began an indigenous diaconate program. Their 
																																																								
12 Sudhanshu Handa et al., “Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in Conditional Cash 
Transfer Programmes: Assessing the Impact of Progresa on Agricultural Households,” 
Journal of Development Effectiveness 2, no. 3 (September 17, 2010): 320–335. 
13 Graciela Messini and Enrique Pieck, Ts’umbal Xitalha’. La Experiencia de Una 
Cooperativa de Café: El Camino de La Sistematización (Mexico City, DF: Universidad 
Iberoamericana, 2012), accessed November 13, 2017, 
http://www.ibero.mx/web/filesd/publicaciones/tsubmal_xitalha.pdf. 
14 Alexander Zatyrka, “Transmission of the Christian Faith with a Mayan Identity : The 




work along with the local church for human rights in the 1960s and 1970s laid some of 
the intellectual groundwork for the Zapatista uprising.  
In addition, guidance from Catholic Social Teaching (hereafter CST) in this 
period of economic development also influenced the Jesuits’ work in Chiapas. As 
subsequent chapters will explain, social encyclicals have repeatedly emphasized 
importance of allowing producers in the developing world access to markets in the 
developed world. CST considers this market access as a matter of justice that means more 
in the long run than the charity of conditional cash transfers.  
In the early 1990s, in the wake of the collapse of the International Coffee 
Agreement, the Jesuit mission’s Center for Indigenous Human Rights (CEDIAC) helped 
a small group of producers organize into a coffee cooperative to provide an alternative 
avenue to sell their raw coffee. The goal was to establish more favorable terms than those 
available through coyotes, who were charging the highly volatile international price of 
coffee.15  Any Mexican citizen can join TX, provided that they convert to organic 
farming practices within one year and that they do not belong to any other cooperatives. 
The governing board of the cooperative sets the price every year, based on the income 
from the previous year.  
Staff members of the cooperative accompany coffee producers to maximize the 
quality of their harvest. In recent years, expanding membership in the cooperative has 
allowed it to increase the price that it can offer coffee growers and invest in more 
production equipment so as to expand the amount of the coffee that it can purchase.   
																																																								
15 In the north of Mexico, the term coyote refers to a broker who helps potential 
immigrants cross the border outside of legal channels. In the south of Mexico with coffee 
production, the term coyote refers to a coffee buyer. In both cases, the connotation 
implies that coyotes take advantage of their clients. 
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 Many qualitative studies have documented the increase in agency and quality of 
life that TX has provided, but until this year, no quantitative study had employed the 
methodology of impact evaluation to evaluate TX.16 Thus, while on the one hand TX 
addresses the structural issues more deeply than either fair trade or conditional cash 
transfers, the qualitative evidence of its success does not dialogue naturally with the 
quantitative studies of the other two methods. A companion thesis in the field of 
development economics by the same author of the present thesis will provide quantitative 
support to these qualitative claims.  In addition, the expanded criteria of this thesis will 
allow for an evaluation of TX that incorporates both qualitative and quantitative methods.  
III. The Task Ahead 
Each of the three projects we have briefly surveyed addresses in a different way 
the plight of the Tseltal people. Fair trade projects create an alternative within the 
existing market structure that diverts rents to addressing some of the structural causes of 
poverty, such as lack of human capital, but not others, such as the organization of the 
coffee market. Even if impact evaluations judge that fair trade cooperatives do not impact 
coffee prices, might they help in other ways? 
PROCAMPO, PROGRESA, and Mexican government land reforms take the 
opposite approach: they provide physical capital (land and cash) in return for investments 
in human capital (health and education). Despite their good intentions, they seem like a 
Band-Aid that does not address problematic market structures in any deep way. How may 
																																																								
16	“Yomol Nohptesel | Comunidad de Aprendizaje Vinculada a Yomol A’tel,” accessed 
April 9, 2018, https://yomolnohptesel.wordpress.com/. At present, nineteen studies are 
complete or in process about Yomol A’tel, including the present thesis. All but one (the 
economic impact evaluation in progress) come from qualitative disciplines such as 
sociology, anthropology, theology, and international development. 	
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we balance the short-term improvements in well-being that appear in the literature with 
the continuation of situations that may hurt the poor over the long term?  
In contrast, Tsumbalil Xitalha’ directly engages the structural forces responsible 
for the poverty of the Tseltales. My own involvement includes coordinating a quantitative 
impact evaluation using best practices in development economics to examine the impact 
of cooperative participation on income from coffee sales. This project is proceeding 
fifteen years after its foundation in 2002. Must we wait for these results to judge it as a 
better development project? 
By combining the approaches of Catholic Social Teaching, a thick but often 
poorly specified body of thought, and Sen’s capability approach, which stems from 
economic realities but at times searches for its own intellectual mooring, in the 
subsequent chapters this thesis develop normative criteria for the evaluation of 
development projects. Chapter 1 will provide more background on the reality of the 
Tseltales, the history of economic development, and the two intellectual resources: CST 
and the capability theory. Chapter 2 will outline five aspects of individual welfare. 
Chapter 3 will outline five aspects of social welfare. The conclusion will deploy these 
criteria of individual and social welfare to provide deeper evaluations of the three 












Chapter 1: Background and Context 
 
This chapter sets the context for a normative approach to evaluate the success of 
an economic development project. First, it looks at the present situation of the indigenous 
Tseltal people in the state of Chiapas in Southern Mexico, who make a living growing 
coffee. It provides background on two structural features of their poverty. Over the 
century, they have gone from growing corn for their own consumption on their own land 
to working as indentured servants on other people’s land growing coffee for sale on the 
international market. In addition, the international coffee market does not allow them any 
control over the price of the raw beans that they sell.  The situation of the Tseltal people 
is one example of a broader pattern in the developing world: people who make a living 
selling raw materials but who remain trapped in structural cycles of poverty.  
Next, it surveys the history of the past sixty years of international development. 
Since World War II, development practitioners have examined the relationship between 
the export of commodities like coffee and the economic situation of the exporting 
countries. They have proposed that modifying the terms of this trade would improve the 
situation of these countries. Depending on the decade, the recommended approach to the 
coffee trade reflects the fad at the time: state coffee agencies, international export quotas, 
or free trade. None of these approaches have improved the livelihood of the people.  
Recently, criticism from within the field of international development has 
revealed the overly technocratic focus of development: it has often offered large-scale 
injections of capital in developing countries from the outside without the consultation or 
involvement of local people. In many high profile cases, these injections of capital have 
not succeeded; sometimes, they have made the situation worse. 
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This debate within the field of development has revealed that despite advanced 
econometric techniques to measure outcomes, the field lacks basic criteria for judging 
what counts as effective development practice or even to choose what outcome to 
measure.  Like the discipline of economics as a whole, development economics prides 
itself on its positive dimension (describing how systems and structures are) and lacks a 
normative dimension (proposing how systems and structures can be).  
In response, this chapter introduces two resources that subsequent chapters will 
use to develop a normative approach to international development. First, the capability 
theory of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum represents the most sophisticated strand of 
thinking about development ethics within the discipline of economics. It aims to justify 
and provide concrete guidance for measuring outcomes other than per-capita increase in 
GDP. Moreover, it is well known to development practitioners and forms the conceptual 
underpinnings of the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations. Capability 
theory tries to draw a balance between respecting pluralism and proposing concrete 
characteristics of individuals to measure.  
Second, Catholic Social Teaching contains the most sophisticated strand of 
thinking about development ethics within the Christian tradition. Addressed not only 
towards Catholics but also to all people of good will, it does not shy away from 
normative claims. Though it offers a rich theological anthropology of the human being 
who is the subject of development, the documents of CST often leave unspecified 
concrete ways to implement its ideals. This thesis will combine the practicality of the 
capability approach and the theoretical backing of CST into a set of five individual and 
five social aspects of effective development.  
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I. A Story of Land and Coffee 
 
Two factors have played a pivotal role in the present situation of the Tseltales: 
their struggle for control over agricultural production on their own land and the 
international coffee market where they sell their products. This section examines the first 
factor: how they lost control both over both their land as a whole and what crops they 
grew on it. Spanish, Germans, and non-indigenous Mexicans play a key role.  
The history of Tseltal agricultural production begins around the twelfth century, 
when the Tseltal people emerged as a distinct group in the Lacondan Jungle, which 
stretches from present-day Chiapas to Guatemala. It continues through several waves of 
landowners from the outside: Spanish, Germans, and non-indigenous Mexicans. With the 
arrival of the Spanish colonists in the 16th century, the Tseltales came to work as hired 
laborers on the royal land grants (encomiendas) of the Spanish. Poor work conditions, 
little better than slavery, led to an uprising a century later in 1712.1   
Over the next century, Chiapas’ relative isolation granted it a reprieve from the 
history of Mexico up to Mexican independence in 1820. Historical records from that era 
record very few ladino (non-indigenous) residents in the traditional tribal lands of the 
Tseltales. In 1824, after shifting between Mexico and Guatemala, Chiapas was annexed 
by Mexico, at the urging of landowners near the colonial capital of San Cristobal de las 
Casas. Nevertheless, it remained isolated from the rest of the country; roads came at the 
end of the 19th century, and a rail connection with Mexico City did not come until the 
early 20th century. 
																																																								
1 Eugenio Maurer, Los Tseltales: Paganos o Cristianos?: Su Religión, Sincretismo o 
Sintesis?, 1a ed. (México, D.F: Centro de Estudios Educativos, 1984), 53–60. 
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Since the mid-19th century, land ownership and tenure rights in Chiapas have 
played a crucial role in the situation of the rural poor. During the dictatorship of Porfirio 
Diaz (1876-1910), as part of his project to bring “order and progress” to Mexico, the Ley 
Lerdo in 1863 offered land held by the Catholic Church and indigenous groups to 
potential investors at a very low price.  By the end of the 19th century, indigenous 
communities no longer controlled their own land and thus many of their members worked 
as indentured servants once again.2 
Bobrow-Strain identifies two parallel processes at work within this transformation 
of the northeastern part of Chiapas in the latter half of the 19th century. First, ladino 
landowners from San Cristobal and other parts of Mexico began to purchase large tracts 
of land that formed a system of fincas, or large estates, many of which remain in the 
present day. Nearly all of these fincas grew sugarcane as their primary crop; they distilled 
some of this sugar into cane liquor (aguardiente) and sold it to the indigenous people. 
Due to the combination of shifting political winds associated with the 1910 Mexican 
Revolution and the difficulty and violence associated with the illicit liquor trade, the 
cultivation of sugarcane ultimately faded by the early 20th century.3   
Second, around the end of the 19th century, in response to Mexican government 
efforts to promote foreign investment, Germans from nearby Guatemala spearheaded the 
conversion of these sugarcane fincas into coffee plantations. Over the next decade, 
however, the collapse of the coffee market and the difficulty of finding local labor caused 
																																																								
2 Aaron Bobrow-Strain, Intimate Enemies: Landowners, Power, and Violence in Chiapas 
(Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2007), 49–53. 
3 Ibid., 56–7. 
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the foreign coffee owners to begin to sell their plantations to ladinos.  The Mexican 
Revolution only accelerated the process. 
The Germans left behind agricultural practices that they borrowed from their 
African colonies. By the turn of the 20th century, half of the indigenous heads of 
household in the region of Chilón in northeast Chiapas worked as residential indentured 
servants on coffee estates. They divided their time between the landowner’s crop, 
typically coffee, and their own crops, corn and beans for subsistence. Moreover, they 
received their wages not in Mexican pesos but in scrip to use at the estate’s tienda de 
raya (company store). A key product available for purchase at this store was cane liquor. 
Many Tseltales remained trapped in this cycle of debt and alcoholism with only fictive 
access to their land and the fruits of their labor until the 1980s.4  
Thus, through no fault of their own, the Tseltal people lost control of their land 
and moved from growing corn to sugarcane and finally coffee. Not only were they 
indentured servants but also they suffered from unjust labor practices and had to purchase 
at high prices basic staples that they could no longer produce for themselves. A cycle of 
dependence stretched on for a century, accentuated by alcoholism. The subsequent 
chapter will argue that any development project must not only deal with the economic 










4 Ibid., 58–65. 
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II. The Volatile Coffee Market 
 
The previous section described how, as a result of outside influences, the Tseltales 
lost control over both the crops they grew and the land that they grew it on. This story 
makes up the first structural factor at the heart of their present economic situation. The 
present section will describe the second one, the volatility of the international coffee 
market. Having produced coffee, they have to sell it to someone in order to make a living. 
The international coffee market has not provided them or other smallholder coffee 
farmers a reliable source of income. Rather, over the past hundred years, it has gone 
through several boom and bust cycles. Numerous national and international organizations 
have attempted to control the price of coffee in response to political realities, not the 
plight of the poor. Thus, the Tselales cannot even depend on a steady income from a crop 
they would rather not grow.    
Since inauguration of the international coffee trade in the late 19th century, the 
price of coffee has exhibited tremendous volatility. At that time, Brazil, the largest coffee 
producer in the world with a 70% market share, could unilaterally control prices; in 1906, 
fearing “a bumper crop that would have caused the already low price to collapse 
completely,” the Brazilian government bought eight million bags of coffee, about a third 
of the world’s annual production, to keep it off the market.5  Though the market 
intervention stabilized in the price of coffee in the short term, it took the government ten 
years to finally sell all of the coffee, and the whole effort required a tremendous amount 
of financing to pay for coffee purchases, storage, and insurance in the meantime. 
Nevertheless, the perceived success of the “1906 coffee valorization” created demand for 
																																																								
5 John M. Talbot, Grounds for Agreement: The Political Economy of the Coffee 
Commodity Chain (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 45.	
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similar actions in 1917, 1921, and 1925; through a regime of price control, the state came 
to manage all coffee exports through a state coffee agency.  
Talbot points out the long-term consequences of these interventions. First, they 
did not address the fundamental domestic oversupply problems in the Brazilian coffee 
market. Second, the artificially high price of coffee motivated such Latin American 
countries as Colombia to continue to increase production as well. In the 1930s, faced with 
more surplus product than it could sell, the Brazilian state destroyed the equivalent of two 
years of worldwide coffee production. Despite its efforts, moreover, the global depression 
in the 1930s reduced the demand for coffee and the subsequent World War II cut off 
Latin American coffee exporters from North American markets. To keep Latin 
Americans from selling to Hitler’s Germany, the United States came to support market 
intervention in the form of the Inter-American Coffee Agreement (1940-45), which by 
setting import quotas for the US market guaranteed Latin American producers higher 
prices.6   
New actors emerged in the post-WWII period that affected the structure and 
dynamics of the market. Supermarkets sold coffee as a loss leader to promote certain 
brands of coffee. US coffee importers and roasters consolidated their market share, so 
that by 1978 four roasters accounted for 69% of US market share. In addition, they often 
used coffee blends from multiple countries as inputs to the roasting process. Thus, no 
coffee processors in the developing world could break into the US domestic market 
because of their lack of market knowledge and financial clout; moreover, they did not 





since it must be consumed in a shorter timeframe than green coffee. In this way, 
developing world coffee producers could do nothing more than sell a raw material at a 
price they could not control.7 
 Talbot analyzes the coffee market after World War II using Karl Polanyi’s notion 
of “double movement.” At first the expansion in demand and reduction in regulation 
triggered another round of expansion in production capacity; the resulting oversupply 
then caused groups of producers to seek state action to stop the price decline. Initially, the 
United States, the largest importer of coffee, opposed state market interventions, but the 
Kennedy administration changed its position out of concern about the effect of a decline 
in the price of green coffee on the political stability of Latin America, which in 1960 still 
accounted for 70% of world coffee exports. In 1962, with US support, a group of coffee 
producing and consuming countries signed the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), 
which established an export quota system.8  
The ICA functioned as a form of indirect aid from the US to its Latin American 
client states as well as from European powers to their former African colonies. Its success 
showed that collective action by producers could both stabilize and raise world market 
prices for coffee.9  Negotiations to renew the ICA for the second time in 1973 failed, 
partially because of the effect of the United States’ abandonment of the gold standard for 
the dollar on dollar-denominated coffee prices. In addition, instant coffee manufacturers 
began production in the developing world, changing the structure of the market by 
allowing developing nations to export a finished product. Two years later, market 
																																																								
7 Ibid., 51–55. 




oversupply turned to market shortage. A severe frost in Brazil in 1975 killed half its 
coffee plants, and political instability in Ethiopia, Angola, and Uganda also affected 
production there. The coffee price rose from $0.80/lb (1975) to $2.20/lb (1976) and 
peaked at $3.40 in 1977 in a market movement that Talbot calls “the most important 
event to happen in the coffee commodity chain in the post-World War II period.”10  
Even as the price of coffee began to decline from 1977 through 1980, coffee 
producing countries manipulated the New York futures market in order to prop up and 
stabilize the price. In 1980, they succeeded in convincing coffee-consuming countries to 
agree to another round of export quotas, bucking a burgeoning global trend towards free 
trade.  Even so, during the 1980s, state-funded investments in better agricultural 
techniques (tecnificación) created oversupply once again. In addition, World Bank and 
IMF structural adjustments incentivized many developing nations to expand their exports 
to repay debts. Furthermore, new coffee-consuming countries emerged that were not 
bound to the original ICA.11 In 1989, negotiations to renew the ICA broke down after six 
months. Bates argues that the ICA’s success ultimately contributed to its decline. Its fixed 
export quotas worked so well that the system it supported could not adapt to changing 
market and political realities.12  
Bates’ account also traces the effect of domestic political shifts in the United 
States as well as coffee-producing countries on the waning support of the ICA; this brief 
treatment will eschew details of these developments. In the international arena, however, 
																																																								
10 Ibid., 68–71. 
11 Ibid., 71–81. 
12 Robert H. Bates, Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee 




he agrees with Talbot on the importance of US strategic interests in the twilight of the 
Cold War on the breakdown.13 The ICA negotiating framework could not accommodate 
US demands to increase export quotas of its political allies in Mexico and Central 
America. Once negotiators from the other parties rejected the terms the United States 
sought, the Reagan White House decided to stand by as the ICA dissolved. It no longer 
faced the threat of communism in South America, and its support of free markets 
coincided with a worldwide movement toward free trade than began in the 1980s. 
The breakdown of the ICA triggered the “coffee crisis” of 1989, when, despite a 
13% increase in the volume of exports, total coffee earnings declined 27%. Without 
export quotas, the New York commodities market and associated financial speculation 
began to play an increasingly larger role in an increasingly volatile price. The situation 
that Talbot describes at the macro level still continues to the present day at the micro 
level among the Tseltal people: 
The entire [coffee] chain, from the coffee fields, to the consumer’s cup, 
came under the control of the TNCs [Transational Conglomerates]. While 
the producing states still were able to exercise some control over the 
segments of the chains within their borders, they were no longer able to 
maintain international solidarity and influence world market prices. 
Therefore, they were no longer able to protect their coffee growers from 
the wild fluctuations in world market prices caused by financial 
speculation, or from the prolonged periods of historically low prices that 
prevailed during most of the 1990s. Increasingly, small peasant farmers 
producing coffee using family labor on one side of the market were 
directly confronting giant transnational conglomerates with state of the art 
information technologies, access to virtually unlimited financial resources, 
and a clear picture of the entire global coffee situation on the other side. It 
was no contest.14 
 
																																																								
13 Talbot, Grounds for Agreement, 81–97; Bates, Open-Economy Politics, 174. 











Figure 1 shows the per-pound price of coffee before and after the collapse of the 
ICA.15 Aside from the effects of the Brazilian frost in 1975, it reveals that the price 
remained between $4 and $6 per pound under the ICA regime. Without the ICA, it drops 
below $2, rises for some time, but then drops again. This price volatility stands out even 
more in light of Figure 2, which shows the steadily rising total volume of world coffee 
exports, as the trend line indicates.16 These data indicate that despite the fact that political 
and corporate interests drowned out the voice of smallholder coffee farmers, the presence 
of the ICA still benefitted them.  
The example of the coffee market shows that regulation of international trade can 
preserve its benefits while mitigating some of the adverse effects, especially price 
volatility. This point rings true especially in present debates about the effect of free trade 
agreements like NAFTA or the TPP on the developing world.  
In addition, the coffee market encompasses more than the price a coffee producer 
can obtain for raw coffee beans. Daviron and Ponte coin the phrase “the coffee paradox”; 
as the data above illustrates, although coffee consumption continues to rise worldwide, 
prices for raw coffee keep dropping.17 Their work outlines an additional factor beyond 1) 
the effect of the collapse of the ICA on the coffee market and 2) the rent-seeking 
																																																								
15 The data come from the annual real (adjusted for inflation) price per kilo of Arabica 
coffee in USD from “Commodity Prices – History and Projections” in “DataBank | The 
World Bank,” accessed November 6, 2017, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx. Like many World Bank data sets, it only 
dates from 1960.  
16 This data comes from “International Coffee Organization - Historical Data on the 
Global Coffee Trade,” accessed November 2, 2017, 
http://www.ico.org/new_historical.asp. 
17 Benoit Daviron and Stefano Ponte, The Coffee Paradox: Global Markets, Commodity 




behavior of coffee roasters, who have come to capture a larger portion of the finished 
product even as coffee farmers barely receive the marginal cost of production. They 
would also like to consider 3) the effect of intangible aspects of the cup of coffee, 
symbolic and in-person qualities of service, which further differentiate the product that 
coffee shop customers consume from the product that coffee farmers produce.  
This analysis of the coffee market reveals two criteria that any development 
project that targets coffee growers must take into account. First, it must consider the 
welfare of all of the participants, including the smallholders who provide the raw 
materials. Second, it must address the structural makeup of the coffee market, including 
the regulation of the price of the raw material and the relative value of different aspects of 
the market: raw coffee beans, finished product coffee, and coffee cups at coffee shops.   
 
III. Can Developing Countries Trade Their Way Out of Poverty? 
The previous section examined the structure of the coffee market. This section 
will connect this particular case to general thinking about the role of commodity trade as 
in international development. The coffee crisis of the 1990s occurred as the field of 
international development celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, having been inaugurated 
shortly after the end of the Second World War. Daviron and Ponte above provide a 
historical survey of the changing perspective of international development specialists on 
the relationship between commodity trade and development.18 They argue that changing 





liberalization did not just affect coffee markets but commodity markets in general. These 
changes reflected political fashion and not the interest of the poor.     
Until World War II, debates about commodity practice considered primarily how 
to deal with oversupply problems such as those that plagued the coffee industry. In this 
time period, producers would organize among themselves to control the amount of the 
product on the market at any given time. After the war, the reconstruction of Europe and 
then the independence of former European colonies changed the dominant approach to 
commodities, from a problem of private enterprise to a policy issue on the national level. 
The solutions of this era involved the role of state coffee agencies to intervene in 
commodity markets to set prices and support the incomes of farmers. International trade 
played the role of an escape valve so that “countries traded only surpluses and deficits in 
international markets – in quantities required to ensure the equilibrium and hence the 
stability of the domestic market.”19 For this reason, these authors point out the absence of 
any structure to manage international commodity markets in the initial phase of the 
international economic regime of the post-World War II period.  
In fact, with the rise of structuralism in the 1950s, development experts tended to 
devalue the production of agricultural commodities and urge developing countries to 
practice import substitution by investing in increased domestic industrial production 
instead, since it could respond better to the productivity increases afforded by technology. 
Protectionism on the part of the developed world, however, inhibited the ability of 
developing countries to export their newly produced manufacturing goods; moreover, 





materials. Thus, commodity exports continued, especially of “exotic goods” for which 
they had a comparative advantage. 
In the 1970s, development thinking changed in three important ways: 1) 
alleviating poverty supplanted increasing national wealth as the goal of development 
efforts; 2) a global approach for these issues replaced a national one; and 3) the failure of 
state-centered approaches to planning led to a preference for market-based initiatives. 
This shift in thinking fueled various types of policy proposals that reflected liberalization 
in markets: privatization of state-run public enterprises such as national coffee 
organizations and elimination of subsidies, taxation, and other domestic price 
stabilization devices. Trends in the commodity price of coffee before and after the ICA 
regime, however, demonstrate that market liberalization increases, not decreases, price 
volatility. World Bank guidance from the 1980s advocates efforts to alleviate the effects 
of price volatility on smallholder farmers through the use of crop insurance and local 
credit institutions instead of eliminating them through export quotas or centralized price 
controls.  
Through the 1990s, states and large firms continued to receive a large share of the 
blame for lack of equitable trade arrangements: developed states use tariffs and subsidies 
to protect domestic production and restrict market access for products from the 
developing world. The fair trade movement, which a subsequent section will examine in 
more detail, represents a response to this trend. In addition, large firms that control steps 
higher up the value chain of commodity productions continue to retain a large portion of 
the rents; in the case of coffee, these firms roast, brand, market, and sell the coffee.  
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Here Daviron and Ponte’s approach contributes to the literature with their 
examination of the global value chain. Their historical survey illustrates the complex 
constellation of factors responsible for the poverty of smallholder coffee farmers and 
others who depend on the trade of other commodities and the failure of fifty years of 
development thinking.  Neither a variety of approaches by the growers themselves, nation 
states, international organizations, nor NGOs succeeded in the past bringing about a 
meaningful change in their situation, because they have not proposed structural changes 
to this global value chain. Their new analytic tool, however, offers promise for more 
sophisticated interventions that could succeed where others have failed.  
 
IV. Development as more than Technocratic 
Mainstream development economists have begun to acknowledge what scholars 
like Daviron and Ponte have pointed out. This section will survey recent work by leading 
development economists William Easterly and Jeffrey Sachs that demonstrates the extent 
and limitations of the self-knowledge of development economists. A survey of the state 
of the field will show the potential contribution to the normative approach of this thesis. 
First, William Easterly recognizes the failure of past efforts at international 
development and the need for change.  Post World War II development practice has 
failed many parties besides smallholder coffee growers. In a recent book, he highlights 
the “two tragedies of the world’s poor”: 1) the fact that their situations of poverty persist; 
but also 2) the fact that as of 2005 the West has spent $2.3 trillion on foreign aid with 
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dubious results.20 He distinguishes two types of development practitioners. Planners such 
as Jeffrey Sachs,21 whose mindset Easterly likens to post-Enlightenment utopian social 
planners, set ambitious goals and propose grand sweeping plans. Like Davies and Pontes 
above, Easterly’s reading of the history of international development reveals the failure 
of these plans to come to fruition: the UN Millennium Development Goals, which aim at 
the elimination of concrete causes of poverty by 2025, emerged out of the failure of a 
similar UN summit in 1990 to eliminate poverty by 2000.          
In Easterly’s account, many development projects have consisted of nothing more 
than injections of unaccountable capital from the outside: physical capital, like roads, 
schools, or hospitals; human capital, like education or training programs of all types; or 
social capital, like help setting up legal systems and financial institutions. Relative to the 
systems that they serve, this capital has more often distorted the system than fixed the 
problem. For example, if a country is assured that donors will provide for the upkeep of 
its schools, it will divert its resources to other places. Moreover, despite the good 
intentions of donors, the recipients of capital have little control over how it is spent; even 
the citizens of a moderately corrupt government, can, with effort, influence the 
destination of their tax dollars more than foreign aid. As previous sections have 
mentioned, effective development projects must not just fix concrete situations but 
improve the agency of the subjects of development in general. Easterly proposes an 
alternative approach: 
																																																								
20 William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest 
Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, Reprint edition. (New York: Penguin Books, 
2007). 
21 Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, Reprint 
edition. (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).	
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Remember, aid cannot achieve the end of poverty. Only homegrown 
development based on the dynamism of individuals and firms in free 
markets can do that. Shorn of the impossible task of general economic 
development, aid can achieve much more than it is achieving now to 
relieve the sufferings of the poor. 
In response to his colleagues, who advocate large, centrally-planned projects that often do 
not involve the voices of the people on the ground, Easterly highlights these four 
strategies: the importance of knowing the particular situation; helping people, not 
governments; constantly evaluating the effectiveness of one’s efforts; and empowering 
local people at every step. His four strategies provide a good foundation upon which the 
next chapter will build. Synthesizing his extensive command of the history of 
development, he is beginning to move from the descriptive to the normative as he asks an 
important question: what qualifies as helpful development?  
In contrast to Easterly’s methodological advance, however, Sachs’ latest work 
still relies almost exclusively on the descriptive. Despite its claim to provide an “analytic 
and normative framework to address sustainable development,” it devotes merely nine 
pages of over 500 to ethics, and this material consists of a cursory survey of six different 
rationales for the importance of “social inclusion,” into which he subsumes most of 
Enlightenment political philosophy. The rest of the work is filled with graphs, tables, and 
policy prescriptions. The social inclusion section ends with the remark that “we therefore 
need to have more discussions, more public awareness, and more debates about these 
underlying ethical choices, because the goals of sustainable development depend on the 
ethical positions we adopt.”22  
																																																								
22 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Ban Ki-moon, The Age of Sustainable Development (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2015), 219–28. 
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On the one hand, this point is particularly well-taken. On the other hand, it 
illustrates the great deal of work that remains in the field of development ethics. Here 
emerges the opening for the normative proposal of this thesis, to fill in the gaps left by 
these distinguished economists. Before the subsequent chapters can outline this proposal, 
however, the next sections must examine two important resources that will ground this 
proposal: the capability approach of secular political philosophers Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum and the literature of Catholic Social Teaching. They will provide the 
building blocks for the remaining two chapters.  
 
V. One Set of Norms: The Capability Approach 
Both Easterly and Sachs acknowledge the need for a public conversation about 
the normative turn to international development. This normative turn, however, requires 
norms. The capability approach stands out as the discipline’s most sophisticated response 
to the normative question of what to measure in the first place. This section will 
summarize the capability approach and differentiate it two previous approaches in 
political philosophy: utilitarianism and primary goods.   
Before examining the capability approach, however, it bears noting that most 
literature in development economists does not examine these foundational questions, but 
rather searches for more precise ways to do impact evaluation, the present best practice 
for evaluating development projects. Impact evaluation adopts a methodology from 
medical drug trials. It begins with an outcome of interest: a measure of the well-being of 
an individual or group that can be compared with the same measure of the well-being of 
other groups or individuals. Typically, practitioners either measure the same individuals 
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before and after the intervention or two different groups, one that has received the 
intervention and one that has not. The impossibility of directly observing the 
counterfactual—two versions of the same person or group, one with and one without the 
intervention—has given rise to a family of statistical techniques to factor our other 
possible influences and isolate the effect of an intervention.  
This thesis will not examine these statistical techniques in general; rather it will 
consider the more basic problem of what to measure and whether to measure at the 
individual or group level. Welfare economist and political philosopher Amartya Sen has 
devoted a substantial part of his career to thinking about just this question.  
In a 1980 Tanner lecture, Sen rejects two flavors of utilitarianism and the primary 
goods of political philosopher John Rawls before proposing his own approach.23 First, 
Sen considers “utilitarian equality,” which allocates a resource in such a way that 
maximizes the aggregate utility. The optimal allocation equalizes the marginal utility of 
all parties. In other words, all would experience the same increase of utility from one 
additional unit of the resource. Utilitarianism works well if all individuals have the same 
utility function: the same desire for and ability to use whatever good is being distributed. 
For this case, a perfectly fair distribution would result in equal total utility as well as 
uniform marginal utility for all individuals. The problem comes in the case of 
heterogeneous utility functions; the “utilitarian equality” approach does not factor in 
distributional inequities that could arise in these situations.  
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Sen uses the example of a disabled person, who would get half the pleasure an 
able-bodied person would derive from the same amount of income. Assuming a utility 







 , then we are searching for the optimum way to distribute 1000 
units of some resource. Utilitarianism would have us maximize aggregate utility:
g(x) = f1(x)+ f2 (1000 − x) . The maximum would give 800 units to the able-bodied 
person and 200 to the disabled person. Despite the equal marginal utilities 
f1 '(800) = f2 '(200) = 0.0177 , the resulting distribution displays anything but equality. 
The able-bodied person ends up with f1(800) = 28.2843  units of utility, while the 
disabled person ends up with f2 (200) = 14.1421 units: half the utility and one fourth of 
the resource.     
 In response to this critique, Sen considers next “Total Utility Equality,” which 
would allocate resources in a way that maximizes the utility of each individual instead of 
the aggregate. To rank different states of affairs, he defines a principle called leximin:  
the goodness of a state of affairs is judged by the level of utility of the 
worst-off person in that state; but if the worst-off persons in two states 
respectively have the same level of utility, then the states are ranked 
according to the utility level of second worst-off. If they too tie, then by 
the utility levels of the third worst-off, and so on.  
Even if we can successfully rank states of affairs in this way, the results do not win the 
approval of all. Sen cites John Rawls’ critique of utilitarianism: “in calculating the 
greatest balance of satisfaction, it does not matter, except indirectly, what the desires are 
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for.”24 If human beings take pleasure in discriminating against one another, for example, 
the deliberative process must consider that criterion, even if we find it morally repugnant. 
The notion of utility does not include enough information to normatively judge 
competing states of affairs.  
Sen turns next to the notion of primary goods, which emerge in Rawls’ thought as 
a way to allow people with different comprehensive notions of the good to find consensus 
on how to structure social institutions. Rawls defines primary goods as “things every 
rational man [sic] is presumed to want. These goods normally have a use whatever a 
person’s rational plan of life.” He offers as examples rights, liberties, and opportunities, 
and envisions this state of affairs as a “benchmark for judging improvements” with a 
version of his difference principle. “If certain inequalities of wealth and differences in 
authority would make everyone better off than in this hypothetical starting situation, then 
they accord with the general conception.”25 Sen points out that Rawls’ primary goods 
still would not help the disabled individual, because the disabled individual does not 
suffer from a problem of distribution, but instead a problem of use.   
This point leads Sen to dispute the presumed homogeneity of the human race 
upon which the notion of primary good depends. “People seem to have very different 
needs varying with health, longevity, climactic conditions, location, work conditions, 
temperament, and even body size (affecting food and clothing requirements).” In its place, 
he offers a notion of “basic capabilities.” For the disabled person, it is the “ability to 
move about” but for others it could be “the ability to meet one’s nutritional requirements” 
																																																								
24	John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2nd edition. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 27.	
25 Ibid., 54–55. 
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(a prerequisite for food), “the power to participate in the social life of the community,” 
etc. The capabilities function at the intersection of external “goods” and internal “utilities” 
as the ability to transform a good into utility at the level of the individual. In further work, 
Sen advances a definition of poverty as not “income deprivation” but “capability 
deprivation,” pointing out the impact of particular features of the lives of the poor on 
their ability to utilize the resources they already have.26 
Since that 1980 lecture, Sen, his collaborator Martha Nussbaum, and others have 
developed Sen’s core idea into an interdisciplinary field of “the capability approach” that 
integrates philosophical ethics, development economics, and the quantitative social 
sciences. It has influenced the practice of development in the form of the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals.  
Presenting an overview of the field, Robeyns identifies five core ideas that 
characterize the approach.27 First come the notion of functionings, states of human beings 
and activities that a person can undertake, and capabilities, a person’s real freedoms to 
realize these states or perform these activities. Next, we can measure these capabilities 
and use them as a metric for interpersonal comparisons. Third, we must acknowledge 
human diversity, both in terms of heterogeneous differences in capability deficiencies. 
Fourth, this diversity also expresses itself in differences in conversion factors: the ability 
to convert an external good into an increase in well-being. Finally, the entire approach 
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rests on the distinction between ends and means: the real effect of resources and 
programs on people instead of the value of these resources in and of themselves.  
This broad tableau still leaves room for a variety of differences in individual 
approaches. Nussbaum the philosopher seeks both to normatively ground the capability 
approach and delineate a universal list of capabilities whose preservation “at a threshold 
level” citizens may demand from their government.28 In contrast, Sen adopts a more 
proceduralist tone: through the process of deliberative democracy, citizens themselves 
can elaborate their own capabilities out of their own cultural context and particular 
situation. Development requires freedom, both to participate in the market and in the 
political sphere. This thesis will draw from both of these strands of the capability 
approach to build its own normative approach to economic development.  
 
VI. Another Set of Norms: Catholic Social Teaching 
The capability approach emerged out of Sen and Nussbaum’s critique of secular 
political philosophy. It represents a possible response to the public debate that Easterly 
and Sachs have proposed. In the same time period, an entirely different intellectual 
tradition has also offered normative commentary on the problems of human development. 
If the capability approach eschews grand narratives and striking images in favor of 
analytic political philosophy and mathematical techniques, then Catholic Social Teaching  
(hereafter CST) employs the opposite approach. Yet precisely the different way in which 
it addresses many of the same questions suggests the possibility of serving as a dialogue 
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partner with the capability approach as part of the normative task of this thesis. In fact, 
various social encyclicals have already begun to engage with their secular counterparts. 
Therefore, this next section summarizes briefly CST on international development.   
Paul VI offered the first sustained treatment on development in CST with his 
assertion that “development cannot be limited to mere economic growth. In order to be 
authentic, it must be complete: integral, that is, it has to promote the good of every man 
[sic] and the whole man [sic]” (14).29 His critique of the role of material wealth resonates 
with capability theorists’ concerns about material goods as ends and not means, as does 
his consideration of other goods like education. Moreover he links general notions like 
social justice with particular features of the “social question” like inequity in trade 
relations: “in order that international trade be human and moral, social justice requires 
that it restore to the participants a certain equality of opportunity” (61). Finally, Paul’s 
critique of technocrats echoes Easterly’s concerns: “necessary technical competence must 
be accompanied by authentic signs of disinterested love” (72).       
Twenty years later, in 1987 John Paul II cites some of the UN social indicators 
that had emerged from Sen and Nussbaum’s work before asserting again the “moral 
nature of development.” His notions of solidarity and preferential love for the poor 
ground more deeply his critique of realities like an international trade regime that 
“frequently discriminates against the products of the young industries of the developing 
countries and discourages the producers of raw materials” (43). Yet, development must 
																																																								





encompass the “cultural, transcendent, and religious dimensions of society as well” and 
provide “autonomy and free self-determination” (46).30   
Finally, in the wake of the most recent global financial crisis, in 2009 Pope 
Benedict XVII takes up again the theme of “authentic human development”, with a 
particular focus on the question of globalization and the need for interdisciplinary 
cooperation to address questions of development.31 He aimed to foster reflection on 
justice as well as notions of human solidarity and gift to the logic of the market as it 
mediates human interaction: “the economy needs a people-centered ethics in order to 
function correctly.” Moreover, Benedict reiterates the principle of the “centrality of the 
human person” as a norm for development efforts:  
The principal concern must be to improve the actual living conditions of 
the people in a given region, thus enabling them to carry out those duties 
that their poverty does not presently allow them to fulfill. Social concern 
must never be an abstract attitude. Development programs, if they are to 
be adapted to individual situations, need to be flexible, and the people who 
benefit from them ought to be directly involved in their planning and 
implementation. The criteria to be applied should aspire toward 
incremental development in a context of solidarity—with careful 
monitoring of results—inasmuch as there are no universally valid 
solutions. Much depends on the way programs are managed in practice 
(47). 
Though CST and the capability approach share much of the same philosophical 
underpinnings, from Aristotelian ethics to modern human rights discourse, respond to the 
same socio-political realities, and propose a normative perspective on international 
development accessible to all people, neither tradition has explicitly dialogued in a deep 
																																																								
30	John Paul II, “Sollicitudo Rei Socialis,” last modified December 30, 1987, accessed 
November 13, 2017, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis.html.	





way with the other. Moreover, little secondary literature has emerged to fill this lacuna.32 
Thus this thesis offers a promising opportunity to explore how each can complement the 
other in fleshing out normative criteria to judge various efforts at international 
development, in the spirit of Benedict’s critique above. 
 
VII. The Task Ahead 
This chapter began with a detailed look at two structural factors that contribute to 
the poverty of the Tseltal people: their lack of control over their own agricultural 
production and the international coffee market. Next, it examined the history of 
international development, which began as a technocratic endeavor, to the present age, in 
which the field has begun to acknowledge the need for a more normative approach. 
Subsequently, it introduced two ethical resources to deepen the reflection that has already 
begun: one from the inside (Sen’s capability approach), and another from the outside 
(Catholic Social Teaching). The subsequent two chapters will use these resources to 
develop criteria of individual (chapter 2) and social (chapter 3) welfare. The final chapter 
will apply these criteria to the three approaches that the introduction surveyed to evaluate 
them in terms of their ability to alleviate the poverty of the Tseltales.  
  
																																																								
32 The only secondary literature I could find does not deal with economic development 
but rather with Nussbaum’s use of the capability approach to defend same-sex marriage 
as a human right, cf Joshua Schulz, “The Capabilities Approach and Catholic Social 
Teaching: An Engagement,” Journal of Global Ethics 12, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 29–47. 
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Chapter 2: Five Aspects of Individual Welfare 
Building on chapter 1, this chapter will examine five aspects of individual 
welfare: human dignity, political rights, socio-economic rights, internal goods, and 
agency. For this task, it will leverage the two normative approaches introduced in chapter 
1: Sen and Nussbaum’s capability approach and CST on integral human development. On 
the one hand, though the capability approach intentionally includes a variety of factors 
other than GDP per capita, it still often does not even attempt to justify its metrics. On the 
other hand, the elegant images and references to the Biblical narrative of CST, though 
inspiring, often lack concrete grounding. The former approach tends toward the 
procedural and eschews a comprehensive conception of the good; the latter paints a rich 
picture of the destination but without any roadmap.  
This chapter combines the strength of both approaches by offering a destination 
and a roadmap. As a destination, it argues that the most effective development projects 
must improve the recipients’ well-being in all five of these areas. As it surveys each 
criterion, it will examine the interrelationships among them. The order of the criteria 
themselves illustrates two important trends. First, external goods give rise to internal 
ones; second, the procedural gives way to a more specified notion of the good.  
Moreover, these five aspects of individual welfare do not by themselves 
encompass all of the relevant features that contribute to poverty. In fact, this exposition 
questions the methodological choice of economists to start from the individual. Both the 
Greek tradition that undergirds capability theory and CST consider society as a whole 
first and then the individual’s place in it. Thus the subsequent chapter will offer five 
aspects of social welfare that complement these five aspects of individual welfare.  
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I. Human Dignity 
In order to judge development projects based on their effectiveness at helping 
human beings, a normative approach must begin with a clear anthropology: who are the 
human beings that these projects aim to help in the first place? Both capability theory and 
CST argue for the importance of recognizing the dignity of the other. This section will 
begin with this personal encounter to develop a philosophical anthropology of the 
subjects of development. It will argue that, despite the apparent difference between the 
metaphysically “thick” CST and metaphysically “thin” capability theory, both share a 
conception of the human person as one who works out his or her salvation in community, 
using the fundamental characteristics of practical reason and sociability. Thus effective 
development projects must recognize these characteristics.  
The architects of CST and capability theory universally credit personal experience 
with the developed world as the source of their reflection. From the perspective of 
capability theory, Nussbaum offers a poetic account of human dignity that shows 
influences of her early work in Greek tragedy:  
We react to the spectacle of humanity so assailed in a way very different 
from the way we react to a storm blowing grains of sand in the wind. For 
we see a human being as having worth as an end, a kind of awe-inspiring 
something that makes it horrible to see this person beaten down by the 
currents of chance – and wonderful, at the same time, to witness the way 
in which chance has not completely eclipsed the humanity of the person.1 
Two features of human life emerge: 1) the Kantian notion of human being as an end and 
not a means; and as 2) the human being as a character in his or her own story. Nussbaum 
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argues for the cross-cultural resonance of this account of human “worth and agency” 
based on our capacity to “respond to tragic tales from other countries.”  
For Sen too, his life experience motivates his work. A detailed historical survey of 
famines early in his career takes on new significance based on a passing comment:  
For example, India continued to have famines right up to the time of 
independence in 1947. The last famine—one of the largest—was the 
Bengal famine in the spring and summer of 1943 (which I had the 
experience of witnessing, in its full rigor, as a nine-year-old boy); it is 
estimated that between two million and three million people died in that 
famine.2 
To my knowledge, Sen nowhere else references any personal experiences in his writings. 
In contrast, in the opening chapter of Women and Human Development, Nussbaum 
presents two case studies of women from her many trips to India and notes that she 
differs from Sen on both the “political importance of the imagination and the emotions” 
and the use of a “narrative method.”3  
On the side of CST, Creighton professor Roger Bergman founded the Peace and 
Justice Studies program there and has spent his career inviting his students and 
colleagues to a deeper appreciation of CST. The first essay in his collection Catholic 
Social Learning emphasizes the importance of personal encounter as a starting point for 
work with the poor.4 For Bergman, a personal encounter with poor immigrants on a 
weekend service trip to Tijuana with his future wife inspired both his conversion to 
Catholicism and his decision to dedicate himself to a life of education and service. 
Looking back, he feels gratitude for “those experiences and the deeply unsettling but 
																																																								
2 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, 1st. ed. (New York: Knopf, 1999), 180. 
Emphasis mine. 
3 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 15.	
4 Roger Bergman, Catholic Social Learning: Educating the Faith That Does Justice, 1st 
edition. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 3–20.	
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formative questions that they raised,” and then offers a general educational principle by 
paraphrasing the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel: nothing but personal encounter ever 
changes anyone in an important way. 
Personal experience grounded the reflection behind the social encyclicals of CST 
as well. Bergman highlights the importance of Paul VI’s own experience of the 
developing world in his encyclical on human development Populorium Progressio: 
Before we became pope, two journeys, to Latin America in 1960 and to 
Africa in 1962, brought us into direct contact with the acute problems 
pressing on continents full of life and hope. Then on becoming father of 
all we made further journeys, to the Holy Land and India, and were able to 
see and virtually touch the very serious difficulties besetting peoples of 
long-standing civilizations who are at grips with the problem of 
development (4).5 
After Paul VI, John Paul II and Francis have continued his practice of papal visits all over 
the world. The USCCB counts 104 pastoral visits of John Paul II outside of Italy in his 27 
year pontificate (1978-2005).	6 The Holy See lists 22 visits of Francis thus far in the five 
years of his pontificate. 7 Their development of CST often references these experiences. 
Thus, any development project must begin with a personal encounter.  
What does the content of this encounter consist of?  At its heart, it is an encounter 
with a fellow social being with the potential to develop herself. Like Nussbaum above, 
the Compendium uses a “narrative method” that begins in the first chapter with salvation 
history: “God’s Plan of Love for Humanity.” Moreover, it defines “every authentic 
																																																								
5 Paul VI, “Populorum Progressio,” para. 4, last modified March 26, 1967, accessed 
March 9, 2017, http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
vi_enc_26031967_populorum.html. 
6 “Holy See,” accessed December 11, 2017, http://www.usccb.org/about/leadership/holy-
see/index.cfm. 




religious experience” as the capacity to “recognize some aspect of God’s face,” in a 
description not unlike Nussbaum’s one of tragedy. Just as encounters with the poor 
motivate the thinkers above, the Exodus story shows that God too has  
seen the affliction of my people who are in Egypt, and have heard their cry 
because of their taskmasters; I know their sufferings, and I have come 
down to deliver them out of the hand of the Egyptians, and to bring them 
up out of that land to a good and broad land, a land flowing with milk and 
honey (Ex 3:7-8) (21).8 
God’s gratuitous action responds to an innate human longing for the divine. Here 
emerges the unique Christian perspective on human development: God’s intervention in 
the world. “Every person is created by God, loved and saved in Jesus Christ, and fulfills 
himself [sic] by creating a network of multiple relationships of love, justice, and 
solidarity with other persons while he goes about his various activities in the world” (35).  
Bringing this perspective into dialogue with Nussbaum and Sen poses 
methodological challenges, not the least of which is that it would seem to require exactly 
the comprehensive conception of the good that both would like to bracket. Nussbaum’s 
version of the capability approach includes a list of Central Functional Human 
Capabilities backed by her own moral anthropology.9 In contrast, Sen never gives a list of 
capabilities, preferring that citizens work out the details themselves through the 
deliberative process of democracy.10  
Deeper engagement with Nussbaum reveals a thicker moral anthropology than she 
acknowledges, one that finds common ground with Christian moral anthropology. 
																																																								
8 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, USCCB (Washington, DC: Libreria 
Editrice Vaticana, 2004). This document is an authoritative summary of CST prepared by 
the Pontifical Council of Justice and Peace at the request of Pope John Paul II.  
9 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 78–80. 
10 Sen, Development as Freedom, 146–59. 
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Nussbaum describes her basic intuition as “that certain human abilities exert a moral 
claim that they should be developed” but quickly describes this intuition as a 
“freestanding moral idea, not one that relies on a particular metaphysical or teleological 
view.”11 This conception would seem to contradict her remarks in an earlier essay that  
the best and deepest of the metaphysical arguments [about the nature of a 
human being] seem to contain an evaluative component: that is, they ask 
us (implicitly or explicitly) to consider which functions of an alleged 
human being are so important, so central, that their absence will mean the 
absence of a human being or human life.12 
Nussbaum develops these capabilities through a close reading of a number of 
passages in the Greek tradition. First, she argues for the central place of communal 
ethical reflection that involves our personal stories, the stories of others, and communal 
stories. In contrast to mainstream economic thinking, the practice of this reflection 
reveals that “we are beings essentially related to others by ties of recognition and 
concern.”13 Second, in a detailed examination of a passage in EN 1.7 in which Aristotle 
asks about the essential “function” of human beings, Nussbaum locates this function in 
practical reason, “the capacity to plan and organize one’s life,” an essential necessary 
condition of humanness.14   
Though Nussbaum avoids teleology by leaving unspecified the good for which 
human beings seek, her proposal still shares a metaphysical element with the Catholic 
view: the human being finds her dignity working out her salvation in community. Thus 
effective development must take into account the dignity of human beings with 
																																																								
11 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 83. Emphasis original. 
12 Martha Craven Nussbaum, “Aristotle, Nature, and Ethics.,” in World, Mind, and 
Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, ed. J. E. J. Altham and 
Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 94. Emphasis mine.  




capabilities of sociability and practical reason. Evaluative criteria for development 
projects, then, must include measures of social relationships. The aspects of social 
welfare that appear the subsequent chapter will provide more details about these 
relationships. Moreover, effective development must increase the agency of its recipients. 
Later on, this chapter will provide more detail about what constitutes agency and how it 
might be measured in practice.  
 
II. Political Rights 
For capability theory and CST, moral anthropology has political implications. 
Nussbaum comments explicitly: “Aristotle’s ethical writing aims to provide instructions 
for the future legislator. The job of such a legislator is to give to the people in his city the 
necessary conditions for choosing a flourishing human life. The city aims at making 
people capable of such choices.”15 Based on the first aspect of human dignity, the next 
sections of this chapter examine the conditions that afford human beings the ability to 
work out their dignity (practical reason) in the context of community (sociability). In the 
modern era, these conditions most often appear in the form of their rights as citizens in 
nation-states or the world.  
This section will use CST and capability theory to argue for the importance of 
political rights, particularly political freedom, and the need to incorporate it in the 
evaluation of development projects. Subsequent sections will examine economic rights, 
internal goods, and agency. One strand of the human rights literature has distinguished 
between political rights about participation in civic institutions, which are usually 
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guaranteed through legislation that establishes the state, and economic rights, which are 
usually guaranteed through positive action on the part of the state to distribute certain 
resources. Though the distinction remains controversial, this chapter employs it because 
the first question of who counts as a citizen of the state is logically prior to the second 
question of what claim citizens can exercise on their fellow citizens’ property.16 This 
section thus begins with background on human rights and follows with capability theory 
and CST’s arguments for the importance of political rights.  
A standard text on human rights describes a right as a “social practice that realizes 
a shared value.”17 Moreover, a human right depends on a conception of human nature. 
The question of how to legitimate the source of human rights has raised controversy 
throughout the tradition: various authors have proposed solutions that depended on 
religious (God or the Bible), political (law), or scientific (psychology or genetics) 
authorities.  The definition of human dignity above allows the present discussion to avoid 
this controverted question. In the nation-state, these two elements of sociability and 
practical reason work together: through shared ethical reflection (sociability), 
communities embark on the coordination required to realize a shared value. In this case, 
the shared value is practical reason: the capacity to make choices and direct one’s life.  
Any discussion of shared ethical reflection begins with the question: who 
participates in the reflective process? Nussbaum deploys two important concepts from the 
political thought of John Rawls: the original position, which describes who is involved in 
																																																								
16 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd edition. (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 27–33.	
17 Ibid., 11. 
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this deliberative process, and the overlapping consensus, which describes the nature of 
the outcome this process can obtain.  
First, Rawls proposes that prospective citizens reason about the nature of justice 
behind the “veil of ignorance” in the “original position.”18 In this situation, “no one 
knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his 
fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the 
like.” Rawls argues that in such a situation, a rational citizen-legislator would choose two 
principles: 1) “equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties”; and 2) “social and 
economic inequalities [. . .] are just only if they result in compensating benefits for 
everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.” The key idea is 
that in the original position, a given legislator does not know the concrete conditions of 
his life in a state that realizes these principles of justice; thus, he will not favor any 
unequal treatment of one group over another lest he end up a member of that group. 
Second, Nussbaum invokes Rawls’ “overlapping consensus,” which depends on 
the distinction between comprehensive liberalism and political liberalism.19 Whether in 
the Greek or medieval tradition, comprehensive liberalism would unite a group of 
citizens around a common conception of a good and judge an institution by the extent to 
which it promotes that good. In contrast, Rawls begins from the indisputable existence of 
“many conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines with their conceptions of the good, 
each compatible with the full rationality of human person.” Moreover, he sees this 
																																																								
18 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2nd edition. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 11–15. 




plurality not as a problem but as the “characteristic work of practical reason over time 
under enduring free institutions.” 
 Thus, instead of a comprehensive conception of justice, Rawls offers a political 
conception of justice: the state ought to structure its institutions and exercise its political 
power in a way accessible to the common human reason of its citizens, the aspects of 
their reason that unite them, not those that depend on particular comprehensive 
conceptions of the good. Thus, political participation stands out as an important criterion 
for an effective development project. Especially in a pluralistic context, allowing for the 
participation of all as equals in the process matters more than imposing a particular 
outcome, however good it may appear to development practitioners.  
As in the previous section, Rawls’ explicit rejection of the metaphysical 
grounding of political institutions would seem to pose problems to the prospect of 
dialogue with the decidedly metaphysical political thought of the Catholic tradition. The 
social encyclical Pacem in Terris offers a point of contact. For the first time in CST, John 
XXIII fully embraces the language of human rights and recognizes in individuals a “right 
to freedom in searching for truth and in expressing and communicating his opinions [. . .] 
within the limits laid down by the moral order and the common good” (12).20 With this 
right and the subsequent rights to “worship God according to one’s conscience” and 
“choose freely one’s state of life,” he seems to be recognizing individuals’ rights to the 
free exercise of practical reason in a way that determines their own comprehensive 
conception of the good. Moreover, nation-states ought to protect these rights juridically in 
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a way that ensures the political participation on the part of all citizens in the affairs of the 
State. Process matters more than outcome from the Catholic perspective, as well. 
 During the drafting of the encyclical, the issue of Catholic participation in 
politics aroused tremendous controversy, whether in secular movements or cooperating 
with non-believers. John XXIII settled the impasse with his remark that  
one must never confuse error and the person who errs, not even when 
there is question of error or inadequate knowledge of truth in the moral or 
religious field. The person who errs is always and above all a human being, 
and he retains in every case his dignity as a human person (158). 
Here he allows for the possibility of an overlapping consensus: that a difference in 
metaphysical commitment does not imply either exclusion from the political conversation 
or the impossibility of finding common ground.  
 Sen too argues for the “expansion of freedom” as the primary end and the 
principal means of development. He differs from those who see democracy as a luxury 
only after the satisfaction of certain preconditions to development.21 As the primary end, 
he sees the goal of development as the ability for individuals to exercise their practical 
reason to live the lives that they would wish to live. As the principal means, through 
empirical examples, he advocates the interconnected nature of a variety of freedoms: 
political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and 
protective security. In particular, he uses the distinction between China and India to show 
that political freedom reduces economic disaster. He credits India’s democracy with the 
absence of famines since 1948, in contrast to China, where 30 million people died in a 
famine (1958-61) after the Great Leap Forward.  
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The case study of China and India shows a point of convergence in the evolution 
of both CST and secular political thought on development. In his commentary on Pacem 
et Terris, theologian Drew Christiansen points out two important shifts from the medieval 
and the modern period: 1) from acceptance of natural inequality to the recognition of the 
dignity of the human person; and 2) from the use of rights language to safeguard 
institutions like the Church to individuals, even non-believers in Catholic countries.22 In 
a similar way, the debate over “Asian values” continues to rage, pitting Sen against 
leaders such as Chinese and others who reject human rights as Western innovations. In 
contrast to his emphasis on the necessity of political freedom, they justify the lack of 
political participation in their countries and outright suppression of minority voices as 
requirements to expedite economic growth.  
Thus capability theory and CST differ from other approaches to development in 
the importance that they ascribe to political rights, especially the right to participate in 
political discourse. Political rights, the second aspect of individual welfare, flow from the 
first aspect of individual welfare, human dignity. In the political realm, human beings 
exercise their practical reason collectively as social creatures. In turn, evaluation of 
development projects ought to incorporate measures of political participation as a way to 
concretely assess the exercise of human dignity in particular contexts. Even if it slows 
down the process, obtaining the consent of individuals on the ground and involving them 
in the process of planning makes up an essential part of development. Even more, the 
presence of ideological diversity does not preclude the possibility of a shared consensus.   
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Interpretations (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 233–35.	
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III. Socio-Economic Rights 
The previous section argued that political rights are a necessary aspect of 
individual welfare. This section argues for the complementary importance of economic 
rights. Once the State is constituted with the voice of all of its citizens at the table, they 
must evaluate the presence of the positive conditions required for human flourishing. 
Political participation provides a good start, but both CST and capability theory affirm 
that political rights do not suffice in the absence of other requirements for human 
flourishing. This section will show how both traditions evaluate institutional structures in 
terms of the situation of the least well off person and examine additional requirements 
beyond political freedom for all members of society to exercise their practical reason. It 
will present the capabilities of capability theory as an improvement over Rawls’ primary 
social goods and find common ground in the notion of capabilities and John Paul 2’s 
analysis of the situation of workers.   
Since human beings develop themselves within the economic sphere, many of 
these necessities are economic in nature: education for work, the opportunity to work, 
and healthcare to return to work. Other necessities go beyond the role of a human being 
as an economic actor and concern elements of a fulfilling life: the ability to have 
meaningful relationships and engage in cultural and leisure activities. All of these expand 
the set of outcomes that impact evaluation must consider beyond political participation or 
even GDP per capita; even more, they introduce a distinction between internal and 
external goods that requires more sophistication to measure.  
As noted above, the distinction between two classes of rights does not entirely 
obtain. Those who prioritize political rights over economic rights try to classify political 
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rights as negative rights that simply establish structures but do not require State action 
and economic rights as positive rights that do require State action such as the ongoing 
operation of social welfare programs. In response, Donnelly points out that even 
guaranteeing negative rights such as the participation of all in civic processes often 
requires positive action on the part of the State, such as the use of federal troops to 
safeguard polling places during the Civil Rights movement in the American South.23 
Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the list in Pacem in Terris (see 
paragraphs 11-27) contain a mix of both types of rights: a right to equal protection under 
the law and a fair trial (so-called negative rights) as well as a right to work and education 
(so-called positive rights). Instead of positive and negative rights, the list of criteria here 
distinguishes between constituting the community to reason about justice and putting this 
sense of justice into practice. While the former is logically prior to the latter, instantiating 
social justice requires both types of State action.    
As chapter 1 described, capability theory defines capabilities in dialogue with 
Rawls’ notion of primary social goods. Here these primary social goods are based on the 
practical reason that constitutes human dignity: “things that every rational man [sic] is 
presumed to want [which] have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life.”24 Rawls 
gives as examples natural goods (health, vigor, intelligence, and imagination) whose 
“possession is influenced by the basic structure [of social institutions], though not so 
directly under its control.” In contrast, society can directly control rights, liberties, 
opportunities, income, and wealth.  
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Like Sen, Rawls sees an index based on primary social goods as an improvement 
over expected utility. Not only does it measure at the individual instead of the aggregate 
level but it also justifies a concrete choice of utility function: “a person’s good is 
determined by what is for him the most rational long-term plan of life given reasonably 
favorable circumstances.”25 
 At first glance, the construction of such a function would seem to be 
prohibitively complex for its use in practical application: not only would it require a 
choice and weighting of a set of primary goods but also a generally-agreed-upon way to 
measure each of them. Such detail would constitute exactly the sort of comprehensive 
conception of the good that Rawls would like to avoid. Instead, Rawls argues that by 
virtue of the difference principle, the evaluation of individual welfare ought only to 
consider the least advantaged group. All members of society “share in primary goods on 
the principle that some can have more if they are acquired in ways which improve the 
situation of those who have less.” Here the contrast stands out most starkly against 
utilitarianism, which would maximize the welfare of the many at the expense of the few.  
CST as well evaluates institutional structures in terms of their effect on the least 
advantaged group in a principle called  “the preferential option for the poor.” Though the 
phrase appears for the first time in an encyclical in 1987, it draws from the extensive 
contact of Jesus with the materially poor, the ministries of charity of the early and 
medieval Church toward the poor, as well as the development and practice of CST in 
modern period. 26 John Paul II offers it as a norm for “logical decisions to be made 
																																																								
25 Ibid., 79–81.	
26 Thomas Massaro, Living Justice: Catholic Social Teaching in Action, 3 edition. 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015), 117–21. 
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concerning the ownership and use of goods” in projects aimed at the poor in the 
developing world. 27 This poverty includes not only “being deprived of fundamental 
human rights, such as the right to religious freedom, but also the right to freedom of 
economic initiative.” As in other Catholic and secular lists of human rights, both political 
and socio-economic rights appear on equal footing here. Moreover, the description 
echoes Sen’s description of poverty as “capability deprivation.” 
Both traditions agree on the fact that a development project must be evaluated 
based neither on aggregate welfare nor on average individual welfare but on the welfare 
of the least-well-off person. Compared to primary social goods, how do capabilities 
function as a means to evaluate individual welfare?  
To develop the concept of capabilities, Sen uses the example of markets.28 He 
considers a hypothetical case where two people receive identical incomes, one in a 
market economy and the other in a centrally planned economy. A neoclassical economist 
would argue for the superiority of the market system based on its improved efficiency. 
Sen offers a different reason: “it can still be argued that there is some social loss involved 
in denying people the right to interact economically with each other.” Even if the two 
systems generated the same results,  
it is not hard to argue that something would be missing in such a scenario, 
to wit, the freedom of people to act as they like in deciding on where to 
work, what to produce, what to consume and so on. [. . .] She may still 
have very good reason to prefer the scenario of free choice over that of 
submission to order.29  
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Sen appeals here to the two principles of human dignity: markets are an improvement 
over central planning because they promote human sociability and the exercise of 
practical reason. Similarly, he judges free labor situations as improvements on slave labor 
situations, even though they do not always result in significant improvements in 
standards of living, because the former arrangements respect human dignity more than 
the latter. 
 Thus a change in social arrangements can increase individual freedoms. In turn, 
individual freedoms can change social arrangements, especially through the exercise of 
public reason, by which citizens define for themselves which individual freedoms they 
value and how they wish to rank them. For this reason, Sen prioritizes political liberty. 
Though he does not offer his own list of capabilities, he favors human capital investments 
that benefit democracy. 
 Like Sen, John Paul II favors human capital investments, not only to increase 
political participation but also to increase economic participation. His experience with 
workers in communist Poland has led him to realize the importance of “economic 
initiative” above. In Centisimus Annus, he laments that “economic development takes 
place over their heads” and “their human dignity is not acknowledged in any real way” 
because they “do not have the means which would enable them to take their place [. . .] 
within a productive system in which work is truly central” (33).30 In addition to the 
traditional Marxist concern about ownership of the means of production, he speaks of the 
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importance of “know-how, technology, and skill” as required for “initiative and 
entrepreneurial ability” (32). Moreover,  
There are many human needs which find no place on the market. It is a 
strict duty of justice and truth not to allow fundamental human needs to 
remain unsatisfied, and not to allow those burdened by such needs to 
perish. It is also necessary to help these needy people to acquire expertise, 
to enter the circle of exchange, and to develop their skills in order to make 
the best use of their capacities and resources (34). 
Here John Paul II expands the components of development: not only elements that will 
increase economic participation but also other elements that may satisfy “fundamental 
human needs.”  
John Paul II’s comment echoes Nussbaum’s intuition above that “certain human 
abilities exert a moral claim that they should be developed,” and she distinguishes 
between three types of capabilities.31 Basic capabilities are capabilities that emerge ready 
to function, like the senses, the capacity to relate to others, and the capacity to work. 
Internal capabilities require more development: sexual functioning, religious freedom, 
freedom of speech, the capacity for love. Combined capabilities require not only internal 
development but external conditions as well.  
For example, a man may be capable of both love and sexual expression but 
prohibited from remarrying because of religious rules. A woman may be capable of 
independent thought but prohibited from expressing a dissident political opinion. “Even a 
highly trained capability can be thwarted,” especially in the case of “an abrupt change in 
the material and social environment.”32 Here, Nussbaum argues, individuals feel most 
sharply the distinction between an internal and a combined capability. On the other hand, 
																																																								




in a case of lifelong deprivation, for example in a country that denies women education, 
the internal capability to reason may also atrophy and the distinction between internal and 
combined capability blurs.  
Though Nussbaum offers a list of ten capabilities, the capability approach does 
not evaluate a situation based on the exercise of these or any other particular capabilities, 
which Nussbaum calls functionings. Rather, it evaluates the situation based on the 
possibility of such functionings. To sharpen the distinction, she uses the example of the 
one who starves involuntarily and the one who fasts, the one who cannot remarry after 
the death of a spouse and the one who chooses celibacy for religious reasons. Though the 
outcome is the same in both cases, one individual chooses freely and the other does not.  
Moreover, public policy ought not to consider simply internal capabilities but 
combined capabilities: in other words, the conditions for the possibility of the functioning 
of capabilities. For this reason, Nussbaum offers combined capabilities as a way to clarify 
the legitimation and purpose of human rights.33 Like the liberalism of Rawls, this 
approach incorporates possibilities: how people can live. Like utilitarianism, it 
incorporates outcomes as well: how people are actually enabled to live. Moreover, it 
lacks the baggage of cultural imperialism that is sometimes associated with human rights. 
Most telling of all, it is based on a shared notion of humanity. As social creatures 
endowed with practical reason (human dignity), human beings can exercise the claim to 
participate in the creation of structures (political rights) that guarantee all people the 
material conditions that allow them to exercise this practical reason more fully (economic 
rights). Thus, CST and capability theory suggest that the evaluation of development 
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projects should include measures of economic rights, e.g. guarantee of education, access 
to health care, ability to marry. Evaluation should take into account the situation of the 
least well off and the ability of the local people to specify the content of these rights.  
 
IV. Internal Goods 
The discussion of capabilities in the previous section introduced the distinction 
between external and internal capabilities. Factors internal to the individual can inhibit or 
enable her ability to take advantage of the political or economic rights that this chapter 
has surveyed thus far. Nussbaum and Sen’s capability theory considers this distinction in 
an explicit way that Rawls’ primary social goods do not, though later work by Rawls 
recognizes the importance of more than externally measurable dimensions of human life 
in human flourishing. Moreover, CST also recognizes and in fact prioritizes the 
subjective situation of people over the objective situation of people. This section will use 
the resources of both traditions to argue that development projects ought to incorporate 
measures of these internal capabilities and value them as much as external capabilities.  
Sen’s consideration of internal welfare begins from the perspective of mainstream 
economics, which acknowledges the difficulty of measuring other people’s internal states. 
Because of this difficulty, economists typically use the choices people make as a proxy 
for the mental processes that drive these choices. Different choices reveal different 
preferences. This technique depends on the assumption of the same utility function for all 
individuals: that two people derive the same utility from the same bundle of goods.  
In practice, human diversity raises questions about this assumption. Sen identifies 
five groups of factors that might lead two people to derive different satisfaction from the 
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same income: 1) personal heterogeneity; 2) environmental diversity; 3) variations in 
social climate; 4) differences in relational perspectives; 5) distribution within the family. 
He calls these factors “conversion factors” because they relate to the ability to convert 
external goods into internal satisfaction. For example, a woman with health problems in a 
rural area in a country with limited employment opportunities for women would derive 
less benefit from the same microfinance loan than a healthy man who lives in a city with 
full access to the labor market. 
Moreover, Sen finds Rawls’ primary social goods an insufficient attempt to deal 
with this situation, for, though his example above uses income as the external good, the 
reasoning applies as well to other goods such as education: the woman above would be 
no less able to use a high-school degree than a microfinance loan. Thus, he proposes the 
capability approach as a method of evaluating the actual opportunities individuals have in 
practice: their capability sets.34 
In his later work, Rawls responds to Sen’s criticism.35 In Political Liberalism, 
after agreeing with Sen on the logical priority of basic capabilities as a way to assess the 
use of primary goods, he sees the task of political philosophy in more modest terms: a 
theory of justice ought to evaluate merely whether a variation in capabilities places a 
citizen above or below the threshold of full participation in society. Beyond this threshold, 
citizens themselves can revise their own comprehensive theories of the good based on the 
available primary goods. Thus, he speaks of a “social division of responsibility”: the 
State maintains a fair share for all of primary goods and citizens adjust their expectations 
relative to the concrete situations in which they live. At this point, he seems to allow for 
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the existence of internal capabilities but does not seem them as relevant for the exercise 
of public reason.  
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls finally recognizes that the interpersonal 
comparisons that public reason employs requires more information than the purely 
external perspective of political liberalism can provide.36 Thus he finally acknowledges 
the importance of considering internal heterogeneities in the exercise of these capabilities 
in the public realm.  
 Contra Rawls’ initial preference for the abstraction of the Original Position, 
Nussbaum argues from the beginning that honoring someone’s human dignity requires 
that she be encountered in the concrete circumstances of her life: “to do justice to A’s 
struggles, we must see them in their social context, aware of the obstacles that the context 
offers to the struggle for liberty, opportunity, and material well-being.”37 The basic 
relationally of human beings opens up a possibility for personal encounter that reveals 
this sort of information, a combination of “overarching benchmarks and detailed 
knowledge of the variety of circumstances and cultures in which people are striving to do 
well.”38 In an Aristotelian fashion, she argues from the particular to the general, to an 
overlapping consensus of minimum thresholds of the list of capabilities presented earlier 
that any just institutional structure should provide. At the same time, she respects 
different paths to the same end by characterizing her minimum thresholds as multiply 
realizable. Nevertheless, the minimum thresholds incorporate information about both the 
external and the internal state of individuals.  
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John Paul II too makes the turn from the external to the internal in Laborem 
Exercens.39 He sees work as “the key to the social question” and wants to reflect on labor 
“from the point of view of man’s [sic] good” in order to “make life more human” (3). In 
addition to the objective qualities necessary for work that were considered before, he 
examines a human being “as a subjective being capable of acting in a planned and 
rational way, capable of deciding about himself and with a tendency to self-realization” 
(6). In other words, he locates human dignity in the exercise of practical reason, not only 
in the fruit of human labor but the way that human beings themselves grow and develop 
along the way.  
He argues that this “subjective dimension” of work is more important than the 
“objective one”; thus, it matters less what kind of work the worker does and more the 
relationship of the work to the worker. Under this schema, highly skilled factory labor 
that pays more than agricultural work could count for less if it does not leave the worker 
with the same sense of dignity as cultivating his own land. On the other hand, a job 
picking crops in the developed world robs a migrant labor of the dignity of running his 
own business in his home country, despite the additional income. Thus, like the capability 
approach, John Paul II proposes additional information bases beyond income for 
interpersonal comparisons:  
it must be emphasized in general terms that the person who works desires 
not only due remuneration for his work; he also wishes that within the 
production process provision be made for him to be able to know that in 
his work, even on something that is owned in common, he is working ‘for 
himself’ (15).   
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Work affects people not only on an economic but also on a personal level. Thus John 
Paul II affirms the equal place of those human rights that deal specifically with work as a 
way to evaluate individual welfare in terms of a worker’s relationship with an employer 
or the state.  
At the end of the encyclical, John Paul II offers the elements of a spirituality of 
work: that through their work, human beings share in the activity of God their creator, 
work out their salvation, and deepen their friendship with God and one another (25). The 
spirituality he proposes at times seems to expand beyond the traditional bounds of a job, 
however, to include times of rest and everyday activity as well. Here the boundary blurs 
between life and work. Comments about the importance that mothers take care of their 
children without working outside the home raise questions about how their experience 
fits in the schema of work as realization of one’s dignity (19). Similarly, though John 
Paul II devotes a paragraph to the disabled person, his remarks assume that all such 
people can work to some degree. What about the human dignity of those who cannot 
work at all? The movement from the external to the internal opens up the consideration of 
human beings as more than economic actors.  
Rawls’ moral psychology too offers a potential path that integrates external and 
internal dimensions of work.40 His Aristotelian Principle proposes that “human beings 
enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities) and this 
enjoyment increases the more the capability is realized, or the greater its complexity.” 
Echoing John Paul II’s remarks, the more interesting job is better, whether it pays more. 
Moreover, this principle applies not only to work but also to life: “as a person’s capacities 
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increase over time [. . .] and as he trains these capacities and learns how to exercise them, 
he will in due course come to prefer the more complex activities that he can now engage 
in which call upon his newly realized activities.”  
Using his practical reason, a person will choose the life that allows him to realize 
his capacities to the extent to which his situation allows. Though the exact instantiation of 
this realization depends on an individual’s comprehensive conception of the good, the 
Aristotelian Principle brings internal goods into the evaluation of individual welfare. 
Thus, in their own way, the moral anthropology Sen, Nussbaum, Rawls, and John Paul 
2’s illustrate the importance of considering measures other than the external presence of 
work or the conditions required for work like education and healthcare in the evaluation 
of development practices. Interesting jobs, stimulating education, or holistic healthcare 
values more, even if these improvement affect only internal measures of good and not 
external measures like average salary, years of education completed, or average life 
expectancy. Moreover, both CST and capability theory open the possibility for the 
consideration of elements that have nothing to do with economic activity at all: increases 
in the potential for artistic outlets, physical activity, or sexual expression as measure of 
human development.  
V. Agency 
The previous four aspects of individual welfare followed a progression that 
successively specified and encompassed more dimensions of human life: human dignity, 
political rights, economic rights, and internal goods. The thin conception of human 
dignity as an individual working out his practical reason in a social context expanded to 
include that individual’s role as a political and economic actor. Moreover, subjective 
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factors of the individual’s experience came into view, and even elements that do not 
relate to the individual’s economic life at all. This section returns to the original 
definition of human dignity to propose a fifth aspect of individual welfare that includes 
individuals’ political and economic success but also goes beyond them. It defines agency 
as an individual’s ability to live out his human dignity as he experiences it. This agency is 
the most important internal good that subsumes all of the others.  
This definition of agency must take into account an individual’s relationship to 
himself. Rawl’s description of the primary good of self-respect and the role of conscience 
in the Catholic tradition provide complementary accounts of this relationship. In terms of 
designing a way to measure agency, behavioral economics has begun to incorporate 
psychological insights into economic metrics, but the liberative pedagogy of Paolo Freire 
challenges it to measure the most important indicator of agency: the extent to which 
development projects give the subjects of development themselves control over the 
process. Here is where the real increase in agency comes: an expansion of the 
possibilities for practical reason in a social context. 
The account begins with Rawls’ notion of self-respect. Despite the plurality of 
comprehensive conceptions of the good in Rawls’ political liberalism and his lack of a 
complete enumeration of primary social goods, he does give an account of the most 
important primary social good, self-respect, which touches on an individual’s relationship 
to himself.41 He situates self-respect in his account of deliberative rationality: at a 
particular juncture in his life, an agent will consider both his own desires and his possible 
options. Imagining the future outcome of each of the possible choices, he will deliberate 
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among them and make a decision. Even with limited information, an agent can make the 
subjectively rational best decision, though it might not be objectively rational. 
In the time horizon of this planning process, Rawls emphasizes the importance of 
continuity, a feature of the plan that “bind[s] together the results and enjoyments of an 
entire life into one coherent structure.” Continuity counteracts regret: “a rational 
individual is always to act so that he need never blame himself no matter how his plans 
finally worked out.” Both the good that comes from this exercise of practical reason and 
the exercise itself depend on the possibility of its exercise in the first place. In the 
language of capability theory, the good relies on the functioning, which in turn needs the 
capability. Thus agency builds on the possibilities opened by political rights, economic 
rights, and internal goods.  
Rawls defines self-respect in exactly this way: “a person’s sense of his own value” 
and “a confidence in one’s ability, as far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s 
intentions.”42 Not only does it require a plan that satisfies the Aristotelian Principle, but it 
also requires a community of people who “confirm and take pleasure” in what the 
individual does. The absence or imperfection of such a community can trigger shame 
instead. Thus the practical reason and sociability of human dignity form the foundation 
for moral agency.  
The notion of conscience provides a point of contact in CST to the primacy of 
place that Rawls gives self-respect. Theologian John Mahoney gives a historical 
overview.43 The term syneidesis originated in “Greek philosophy’s identification of the 
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experience of self-awareness in the forming of moral judgments.”44 Both in the Greek as 
well as the Early Christian tradition, it is a constitutive element in the practical reason of 
all human beings. Moreover, it is more than a space of private moral reflection but takes 
on a social dimension. Thus it is the heart of human dignity. Paul speaks of the “law of 
God” written on the hearts of all in Romans (2:15), and Aquinas the need for recourse to 
external sources of reason to compensate for internal deficiencies. Conscience is 
developed in community. 
Like the primacy of place that Rawls affords self-respect, Aquinas emphasizes the 
importance of an individual’s fidelity to himself as he experiences his conscience. To this 
end, despite his recognition of the imperfections in individual consciences, especially 
when they are applied to particular situations, Aquinas requires that an individual follow 
his conscience, even if his conscience errs, because not to do so would be to disregard 
one’s own sense of truth, which ultimately derives from God.45 At the same time, as part 
of the growth of an individual’s life of faith, he presumes that the individual’s conscience 
will grow in conformity to the Divine Law of God.  
In the modern period, Aquinas’ thought presaged a shift in Catholic teaching on 
religious freedom: the duty of the state to provide true religion and thus the salvation of 
the souls of its citizens has been supplanted by the even more important duty to respect 
their human dignity: “men should act on their own judgment, enjoying and making use of 
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a responsible freedom, not driven by coercion but motivated by a sense of duty.”46 The 
previous section on political rights referenced another implication of this line of 
reasoning: Pope John XXIII’s acceptance of the language of human rights. Thus Rawls 
and CST agree on the importance of an individual’s sense of himself and the capacity to 
evaluate that sense. Next this section examines possible ways to measure agency.  
One approach comes from within the discipline of economics. The new subfield 
of behavioral economics has begun to incorporate psychological insights into economic 
literature. Following Aquinas’ description of conscience, behavioral economists 
acknowledge fallibility in human decision making while evaluating different “nudge” 
approaches to improve it.47 They evaluate these interventions using the same impact 
evaluation techniques, constructing treatment and control groups and comparing 
outcomes.  Nevertheless, their methodology falls victim to the same critique of this 
thesis: who defines the outcome variables? Until the subjects themselves not only choose 
the outcomes of interest but also design the interventions, they remain merely the passive 
recipients of aid instead of active subjects of development. Thus, in order to measure 
agency, impact evaluation must look outside of itself.  
Nussbaum’s work in Greek tragedy, Rawls’ consideration of the time horizon of 
an individual’s life plan, and CST’s references to salvation history hint at the narrative 
dimension of development. Another possible approach could consider individuals in the 
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context of their life stories and the stories of the communities around them. Paolo Freire’s 
theory of education offers a promising possibility. Instead of the banking model by which 
teachers deposit knowledge in students’ minds, or, by extension, a model in which 
development practitioners implement projects for members of the developing world, he 
proposes a liberative pedagogy that he calls “education as the practice of freedom”: 
Students, as they are increasingly posed with problems relating to 
themselves in the world and with the world, will feel increasingly 
challenged and obliged to respond to that challenge. Because they 
apprehend the challenge as interrelated to other problems within a total 
context, not as a theoretical question, the resulting comprehension tends to 
be increasingly critical and thus constantly less alienated. Their response 
to the challenge evokes new challenges, followed by new understandings; 
and gradually the students come to regard themselves as committed.48 
Freire’s approach suggests measuring elements that have not appeared thus far. On a 
practical level, this criterion would include the processes used to design and run 
development projects. Before designing and evaluating proposed solutions, who decides 
what counts as a problem in the first place? How many local people are involved in the 
planning and ongoing administration of the project? Who decides how resources are 
allocated? After the initial intervention by the development agency, in what time period 
does the project shift to complete local control?   
By many metrics, two development projects could experience the same success. 
The one that takes place at the request of local people, involves the input of local people, 
trains local people, and is administered by local people will in the end enhance the ability 
of the local community to implement future development projects in a way that the other 
one does not. This section proposes that this increase in agency serves as the ultimate 
goal of development.  
																																																								




This chapter set out to evaluate five aspects of individual welfare to evaluate 
international development projects. It has employed resources from political philosophy: 
the thought of John Rawls and the capability theory of Sen and Nussbaum. In turn it has 
put these resources in dialogue with Catholic Social Teaching, especially in recent social 
encyclicals.  The discussion of these five aspects followed a progression that highlighted 
the way that they built on one another. It began with the first aspect, human dignity in the 
form of practical reason and sociality. It turns to political and socio-economic rights. The 
language of capabilities works better than rights because it accounts for individual 
heterogeneities; moreover, it encompasses not only external but also internal goods. 
Central among the internal goods is the good of how individuals relate to themselves their 
exercise of practical reason. The chapter ended by arguing for the importance of 
considering this increase in agency.  
All along, however, the discussion has failed to examine one methodological 
presupposition: the choice to construct a measure of social welfare as some combination 
of measures of individual welfare, instead of the other way around. From the beginning, 
human dignity encompassed the sociability of human beings; political and socio-
economic rights concerned the obligations of the community to the individual, especially 
the least well off. Moreover, internal goods include an individual’s sense of belonging or 
relationship to the community. Even the sense of agency concerns not only whether an 
individual can work out her life plan but also whether a community can confront a 
challenge itself, or at least on equal footing with an outside partner.   
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Therefore, the subsequent chapter will propose five aspects of social welfare that 
describe aspects of international development that these aspects of individual welfare 
have not yet included. This thesis will argue that only the combination of individual and 
social welfare can effectively provide normative criteria for measuring the effectiveness 






Chapter 3: Five Aspects of Social Welfare 
 
In attempting to develop a normative approach for the evaluation of development 
projects, the previous chapter surveyed five different aspects of individual welfare: 
human dignity, political rights, socio-economic rights, internal goods, and agency. The 
chapter traced several points of contact between Catholic Social Teaching and the 
capability approach that suggested the possibility of a mutually enriching conversation. 
Nevertheless, by the end of the chapter, what emerged were primarily the limitations of 
the point of departure itself: if any metric of individual welfare depends on agency, and 
individuals exercise their agency in relationships, a normative approach ought not to start 
from individual welfare and move outward to social welfare, but rather it should begin 
with social welfare and examine individual welfare against that backdrop. 
In a similar way, the present chapter will examine five aspects of social welfare. 
This thesis argues that normative evaluation of development projects depends on 
measuring their impact on social welfare, and this task requires both a clear criteria of 
what to measure and how to measure it. CST will offer clues to the former; political 
philosophy and economics will assist with the latter. Each section will integrate elements 
of CST and the economics literature:  social welfare and the common good, solidarity and 
social capital, subsidiarity and small-scale development, extractive institutions and 
dependent relationships, and authentic development and mutual flourishing.  
The first section traces the history of economic attempts to measure social welfare. 
All have sought to integrate measures of individual welfare; sensitive to the reality of 
pluralism and the rights of minorities, recent work has distinguished between individual 
comprehensive conceptions of the good and common societal values. Nevertheless, this 
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methodology often has failed to consider interpersonal relationships on an equal ground 
with other elements of individual welfare like income, educational attainment, health, or 
personal happiness. A recent attempt in theology to provide empirical ways to measure 
the common good in light of CST indicates the importance of these relationships.  
The second section more deeply examines these relationships, using economic 
literature on social capital and CST on solidarity. Both perspectives argue for the 
importance of repeated patterns of individual interactions in constructing broader societal 
norm. In addition, it proposes a new method, game theory, to measure social welfare than 
the simple aggregation of individual welfare of the first section. Game theory traces the 
effects of individual interactions on larger patterns of group behavior; here it reveals the 
result of different approaches to interpersonal interactions, especially economic 
transactions, on social norms around trust. Despite the advantage of selfish behavior in 
the short term, in a sufficiently small community with frequent interactions between 
members who know one another, trusting behavior wins out over the long term wins out 
and constructs a social norm that ultimately benefits the entire community.   
In the third section, CST’s notion of subsidiarity as well as literature on small-
scale development corroborate this theoretical claim with complementary insights about 
how to structure social realities in a way that enhances individual agency: economic 
development works best when small groups of local people take responsibility for it.  
With this ideal in mind, the fourth section analyzes situations in which individuals do not 
experience individual agency, using economic literature on extractive institutions and 
CST on dependent relationships to examine the root causes of these situations. It argues 
that these situations involve large groups of anonymous interactions that lack solidarity.  
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The final section offers the methodological resource of Christian spirituality in 
general as well as Jesus’ parables about the Kingdom and the practice of the Eucharist as 
normative guidance about proper relationships in the Kingdom of God. It argues that 
these practices function in two important ways: first, as metrics to evaluate social welfare, 
and second as concrete ways to reshape social welfare through the engagement of 
individual imaginations. Guided by these practices, renewed individually will relate 
differently to one another, both inside and outside the economic sphere, in ways that 
restructure social realities. Here we encounter the invitation of integral human 
development to deepen relationships that enhance our own agency and the agency of 
those around us.  
I. Social Welfare and the Common Good 
 This section begins with Amartya Sen’s extensive work on metrics of social 
welfare. Based on his experience in the pluralistic Indian context, Sen builds on Pareto 
efficiency and Arrow’s impossibility theorem in search of a way to construct a social 
structure that respects minority viewpoints, so that the individual preferences of all are 
incorporated more completely in social preferences. It argues that Sen’s work falls short 
in two respects: first, it does not engage the interpersonal dimension of human life as a 
constitutive element but merely as a second-order good, and second, it fails to offer a 
richer vision of social welfare beyond the procedural.  
In the process, Sen engages with Rawls’ Original Position, which invites the 
reader to put herself in the position of another who differs in concrete circumstances. 
This exercise bears relevance to the present discussion for two reasons. First, the notion 
of solidarity in CST begins with just such an encounter. Second, the use of the 
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imagination will play an important role in the Christian spiritual practice that the final 
section proposes. After an interlude with Rawls, the section turns to economist-
theologian Albino Barrera’s proposal for empirical metrics of the common good. Barrera 
measures a much richer set of individual and social indicators than the usual literature, 
and his work bears much in common with Nussbaum’s list of Basic Human Capabilities 
from the previous chapter.  
In addition, both Barrera and Nussbaum employ a narrative methodology. 
Barrera’s presentation of the theological foundations of the common good incorporates 
elements of the Biblical narrative, and other work by Nussbaum seeks to add a narrative 
dimension to a nation-state’s common good. By seeing human life in terms of plot and 
characters instead of empirically quantifiable elements, narratives provide an alternate 
way for how individual interactions fit together into broader social patterns. The 
subsequent section will continue to mine this question of how to integrate individual 
encounter and social structures, at the heart of social welfare. 
First, however, it begins with Amartya Sen’s work on social welfare functions. 
Sen recounts that in his undergraduate years, “my attempts to get my fellow students—
and teachers—interested in social choice theory were a dismal failure.”1 Fortunately, his 
interest in the subject continued, leading to the production of a body of work that 
eventually garnered him the Nobel Prize. Sen describes the goal of his project as the 
incorporation of interpersonal comparisons of utility into the social choice framework 
developed by Kenneth Arrow. 
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Before Arrow, Pareto proposed a method that ranked one social situation B as 
better than another A if some individual preferred B to A but no individuals preferred A 
to B. In turn, using this approach, we can label a social situation Pareto-efficient if no 
change can be made that would result in an improvement for one person without a loss 
for another person.2 Arrow builds on Pareto’s work by considering the problem of finding 
a mathematical function that maps individual preferences to social preferences. His result, 
the Arrow Impossibility Theorem, claims that no function can satisfy these four criteria: 
1) it works with any set of individual preferences; 2) it follows the Pareto principle 
above; 3) it does not require any information beyond individual preferences; 4) it does 
not give an individual dictatorial power over the group.3 
To overcome this dilemma, Sen introduces the distinction between basic and non-
basic judgments, preferences that an individual is willing to revise and ones that he is 
not.4 For example, faced with a group majority at odds with his individual preference in a 
given situation, an individual might choose to revise this particular preference (a non-
basic judgment) in favor of a commitment to the group as a whole (a basic judgment). On 
the other hand, particular historic situations can affect one’s underlying commitments to 
institutional structures: the tenure of Oliver Cromwell motivated Thomas Hobbes’ 
Leviathan, the French Revolution motivated Condorcet’s early work in voting theory, and 
the institution of slavery spurred amendments to the US Constitution. These examples 
represent one extreme in which some individual preferences affect basic values, but at the 
opposite extreme, in a liberal political framework, other individual preferences carry no 
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weight at all, such as whether one sleeps on one’s stomach or one’s back, a purely private 
preference.5 Thus unlike Pareto and Arrow, Sen allows for a mutual relationship between 
individual preferences and group social norms that foreshadows the next section’s use of 
game theory. His account also implies a temporal dimension to the formation of group 
preferences that allows for the narrative method below, though as a classically-trained 
economist, he would probably admit variation over the course of time only as an 
intermediate stage on the way to equilibrium, a social arrangement that perfectly captures 
individual preferences for all time. 
For the moment, Sen delineates three important questions around social welfare: 
1) what informational base to use to measure individual welfare; 2) how to compare the 
welfare of two individuals; and 3) how to integrate these interpersonal comparisons of 
individual welfare into a metric of social welfare.6 The second chapter examined and 
rejected a number of possible solutions to the first question. For the moment, this section 
focuses on Sen’s proposal for the second one: “one method of making interpersonal 
comparisons is to try to put oneself in the position of the other.”7 As examples of this 
approach, he cites Jesus’s Golden Rule, Kant’s Categorical Imperative, and Rawls’ 
Original Position, which we briefly reviewed in the previous chapter.   
The previous chapter’s reference to the Original Position highlighted the inclusion 
of all citizens in the process; here this section pays close attention to the way that it 
invites all citizens to use their moral imagination to evaluate a proposed institutional 
arrangement from another perspective than their own. Rawls begins with an abstract 
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situation, his “veil of ignorance,” in which the participants are not aware of their own 
particular characteristics; from here, he derives as part of “justice as fairness” a principle 
that permits any social inequality only if it makes the worst-off person better off.  
Though Sen points out the limitations of Rawls’ difference principle, he praises 
the method: “the idea of morally recommending a collective choice mechanism.”8 After 
surveying a number of additional methods, however, at the end of his exhaustive work, 
he offers rather thin criteria for a constructive approach. As chapter 2 discussed, the 
normative criteria Sen does offer tends towards the proceduralist: 
The conceptual underpinning of normative social choice theory as an 
approach is centrally dependent on reasoning in general, and public 
reasoning in particular. Indeed, the fundamental connection between 
public reasoning, on the one hand, and the demands of participatory social 
decisions, on the other, is central not just to the practical task of making 
democracy more effective (important as it is), but also for achieving an 
adequate understanding of the demands of social choice.9 
Sen’s strong expression “the demands of social choice” refers to the need for democratic 
institutions to provide an alternative response to authoritarian institutions and present 
global crises: he gives the examples of the lack of respect of women’s rights in many 
countries and the continued use of capital punishment. Whatever the dilemma, Sen favors 
arriving at a solution through public reason instead of coercion in order to respect 
individual freedom; moreover, in addressing pressing questions of global justice, he 
counsels that we ought not wait on perfect solutions or institutions but rather should 
implement whatever partial consensus public reason can achieve.  
Despite the laudable character of these principles, they fail to satisfy in two ways. 
First, because Sen begins at the individual level by constructing a metric of social welfare 
																																																								




based on individual preferences, he cannot offer a richer vision of social welfare except 
for that society in which all are involved in a deliberative process. Second, though he 
successfully integrates interpersonal comparisons into Arrow’s decision framework, he 
does not touch on the relational dimension of individual welfare. Extensions to Sen’s 
work could in theory expand the informational base of interpersonal comparisons by 
incorporating internal measures of good such as psychological metrics of happiness, 
which include satisfaction in relationships. Nevertheless, such concerns would remain 
secondary and lack normative force, for another metric of social welfare could just as 
well not consider these dimensions of human life. 
Like Sen, economist and theologian Albino Barrera attempts to apply the abstract 
notion of the common good from Catholic Social Teaching to concrete economic realities, 
offering his own proposed metric to measure social welfare. Barrera himself 
acknowledges that he faces two problems at the outset: first, official church teaching on 
the common good has appeared most often in the context of encyclicals that have offered 
winding commentary upon the social situation of particular eras, not as a focused set of 
universally valid principles; second, despite concrete mention of particular realities, the 
principles posed in these responses have remained at the level of abstraction, lacking 
detail of implementation.10  Nevertheless, he begins with the most recent official ecclesial 
definition of the common good: “the sum total of social conditions which allow people, 
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either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more fully and more easily.”11 
Barrera seeks to evaluate social conditions based on their effect on individual fulfillment. 
In his presentation of the common good, Barrera employs narrative elements. 
Barrera derives three characteristics of the common good from the Biblical account of 
sdq (justice): 1) its place as part of the divine order; 2) the role of human beings in 
participating in this divine order; 3) the importance of right relationships in this divine 
order. The Biblical tradition offers a variety of eschatological images for this common 
good, e.g. each person sitting under his own vine and fig tree (Mi 4:1-5), the land of milk 
and honey (Dt 30:20-21), or the goodness of the Garden of Eden (Gen 1).  Although these 
images would be inadmissible in the public deliberations of political liberalism, they 
exert an emotional force more powerful than even the most appealing principles of justice 
and deliberative democracy.  
In fact, Martha Nussbaum devotes an entire work to the reconstruction of civil 
religion as a key to strengthening democracy. In contrast to Rawls and Sen, who 
emphasize the importance of reason, she argues: 
Real people are sometimes moved by the love of just principles presented 
just as such, abstractly; but the human mind is quirky and particularistic, 
more easily able to conceive a strong attachment if these high principles 
are connected to a deeper set of perceptions, memories, and symbols that 
have deep roots in the personality and in people’s sense of their own 
history [. . .]. If the sources of memory are securely tethered to political 
ideals, however, such problems can be transcended, and the symbols may 
acquire a motivational power that bare abstractions could not possess.12 
Like Barrera’s recourse to Scripture above, Nussbaum’s use of narrative and images 
implies a fuller picture of human beings than the dominant model of rational agents of 
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economics. This philosophical anthropology aligns with both of their subsequent 
consideration of a richer set of outcomes of interest for integral human development.  
 Barrera continues: material sufficiency is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for economic prosperity. Human beings freely exercise their moral agency to 
satisfy the basic needs of themselves and others; they do not satisfy these needs as ends in 
and of themselves, however, but as a means to deeper life in God. References to God do 
not pass muster in the arena of public reason, but references to the transcendent might 
possibly, in the sense that integral human development consists in the “development of 
the whole person (body, mind, and spirit).”13  
Moreover, the eschatological orientation above provides a framework of 
obligations to self, others, and the environment. Functioning in a way similar to 
Nussbaum’s list of Basic Human Capabilities, Barrera’s work provides a list of 
obligations and metrics for governments, households, and business that taken together 
consist of a schema for measuring the realization of the common good in a particular 
country at a particular time.14 The real contribution of CST, however, comes in its 
treatment of the virtue of solidarity, to which this chapter now turns.  
 
II. Solidarity and Social Capital 
This section will begin with literature from CST and economics on solidarity, 
which operates at the level of individual interpersonal interactions. Next, it will present 
the analogue at the societal level, social capital, and explore different approaches to 
measure it. The first wave of empirical studies measured trust using responses from 
																																																								




cross-cultural household surveys; subsequent research has used the tools of game theory 
to model the relationship between repeated individual interactions and social norms. 
Game theory results provide important insights about the importance of network size and 
frequency of interaction for the emergence of social norms that facilitate development. 
These empirical results will motivate the subsequent section’s presentation of subsidiarity 
and small-scale development.  
The first sustained treatment of solidarity in CST comes in John Paul II’s 
encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis.15 Twenty years after Paul VI’s Populorum Progressio, 
at the twilight of the Cold War, John Paul II here offers his own perspective on human 
development. Whereas Paul VI mentions solidarity in terms of reciprocal obligations both 
at the level of the individual and the nation-state, John Paul II expands the concept, 
describing solidarity as a virtue that responds to the moral evil of “structures of sin.”  
It is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the 
common good; that is to say, to the good of all and of each individual, 
because we are all really responsible for all. This determination is based 
on the solid conviction that what is hindering full development is that 
desire for profit and that thirst for power already mentioned. These 
attitudes and “structures of sin” are only conquered – presupposing the 
help of divine grace – by a diametrically opposed attitude: a commitment 
to the good of one’s neighbor with the readiness, in the gospel sense, to 
“lose oneself” for the sake of the other instead of exploiting him, and to 
“serve him” instead of oppressing him for one’s own advantage (38).  
Solidarity refers to a particular way human beings relate to one another: recognizing 
mutual responsibility instead of taking advantage, serving instead of exploiting.   
To cash out this definition, we must deepen our understanding both of “common 
good” and “social sin.” Hollenbach contends that in order to strengthen the bonds of 
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society that make up common good we must recognize “human relationships as 
intrinsically valuable in and of themselves.” 16  He builds on Aristotle’s distinction 
between instrumental and intrinsic friendship in the Nichomachean Ethics and Kant’s 
between using human beings as ends or means, but extends them: the fruits of human 
relationship expand beyond the friends to a “shared life of communication and interaction 
with others.”  
This shared life includes meeting the needs of individuals, such as the various 
forms of individual welfare that chapter 2 surveyed. Individual welfare, however, does 
not serve as an end in and of itself; instead, it allows for a deeper shared public life that 
both “fulfills needs that individuals cannot fulfill on their own” and “realizes non-
instrumental values that can only be attained in our life together,” chief among them our 
“moral interdependence,” as John Paul II expresses above: “we are all really responsible 
for all.”  
The economics literature also links solidarity with mutual responsibility. A classic 
study by Fafchamps notes that “the ethical values of pre-capitalist societies emphasize 
solidarity as a moral obligation and subsistence as a right.”17 He describes pre-capitalist 
solidarity systems in terms of “mutual insurance.” 
The person receiving assistance is not expected to give back something 
equivalent to what is received. What is expected from the recipient is 
simply to help others in return. How much help must be provided is not 
entirely specified. It depends on the recipient’s own circumstances at the 
time as well as on the situation of those calling for help. 
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Surprisingly, in difficult times, e.g. situations of war or natural calamities, Fafchamps 
documents that the use of solidarity and mutual assistance increases. He also notes the 
“incentive problems” that come with solidarity networks, including freeloading, to which 
this section will return.  
The concept of social capital from the discipline of sociology provides a bridge to 
move from solidarity, which operates at the level of individual interpersonal interactions, 
to an aspect of social structures writ large, and by extension a measure of social welfare. 
This tool has been used by sociologists to study the effect of social relationships on 
economic prosperity. Sociologist and theologian John A. Coleman offers a summary 
definition from the literature: “dense networks of interaction anchored in social space 
between the family and the state, which facilitate access to human capital (skill 
formation) and wealth opportunities.”18 
As Coleman points out, social structures can cut both ways: they can offer 
opportunity for the powerless as well as fortify the positions of the powerful. The mere 
presence of relationships, however, does not guarantee either economic prosperity or 
civic virtue; in certain cases, like the mafia, in fact, social capital may grant the former 
but not the latter, in a way that harms broader society instead of helping it. Nevertheless, 
Coleman highlights four ways that social capital can optimize market interactions: 1) it 
encourages cooperation instead of free riding; 2) it makes everyday interactions less time-
consuming, cumbersome or costly; 3) it expands an individual’s awareness of linkages; 
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4) it serves as a conduit for useful information. By this reasoning, the strengthening of 
social capital in a country would improve the performance of its economy as well.19  
One potential problem arises with the difficulty of measuring social capital. Like 
notions of the common good, the variety of open-ended definitions of social capital have 
often left little that is tractable for economic analysis, despite the cross-country 
qualitative comparisons that its advocates in sociology have employed. Here two recent 
developments in the economics literature offer a guide. First, economists Stephen Knack 
and Philip Keefler find a positive, causal relationship between trust and civic 
participation, as measured via the cross-country World Values survey, and GDP growth 
on a panel of 29 countries over 12 years.20 They offer their results as empirical backing to 
the claim above about the role of social capital in economic performance. In further 
analysis, they find additional positive relationships between these measures of trust and 
both government performance and the security of property rights. This result gives 
insight into the mechanism by which social capital helps: it “lubricates” and strengthens 
formal institutional structures. 
Second, Bruce Wydick applies game theory to networks of social interactions to 
analyze social norms about trust.21 He notes that in many communities with high social 
capital, trust acts like a social norm. In a situation like market exchange, how could a 
social norm have evolved? One approach would look at the interaction between two 
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anonymous buyers and sellers as a version of the well-known Prisoners’ Dilemma. The 
small incentive favoring cooperating pales in comparison to the larger incentive for either 
party to cheat the other.  
When the market interaction functions not as an isolated case, however, but as 
part of a repeated set of social interactions on a regular basis, the optimal outcome 
changes. If the two parties do business often enough, the aggregate profit over numerous 
successful exchanges comes to outweigh the one-time advantage that may derive to one 
party when cheating the other. The two key variables of frequency of interaction and size 
of the network determine the overall outcome of the system. A small-enough system with 
frequent interactions creates an incentive structure that favors trustworthy behavior. 
Moreover, as an extension, Wydick allows for a mix of two kinds of market actors—
Trusters and Cheaters.  Here too, a high-enough percentage of Trusters can sustain the 
social norm of trustworthy behavior despite the presence of a small minority of Cheaters.   
As Wydick comments, these results show that “smaller, informal networks offer 
some advantages that are not characteristic of more formal economies where interaction 
is more anonymous.” He offers examples of networks of traders and moneylenders in 
developing countries in which network size allows for the accumulation of social capital 
that reduces transaction costs. Even with formal institutional structures, larger scale 
networks cannot compete.  
Thus, this section argues that the combination of solidarity at the individual level 
and social capital at the societal level represent an important aspect of social welfare. In 
addition, the analytical tool of game theory provides a better alternative to understanding 
the relationship between the micro and the macro: individual interactions and their 
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society-wide outcomes. In addition to quantifying the benefits of solidarity, game 
theoretic results about optimal network size and frequency of interactions also offers 
empirical support for the principle within Catholic Social Teaching of subsidiarity and 
recent economics literature on small-scale development, which the next section examines. 
   
III. Subsidiarity and Small-Scale Development 
Building on the previous section’s discussion of the mechanisms by which 
solidarity and social capital contribute to social welfare, this section will explore two 
complementary approaches to structuring society that facilitate these mechanisms: the 
principle of subsidiarity in Catholic Social Teaching and the recent trend of small-scale 
development in economics. Pope Pius XI’s insights about the situation of labor in the 
developed world find much common ground with development economist Manfred Max-
Neef’s reflections on his work in the developing world. Both offer concrete guidance 
about how to structure the social order to facilitate development: it must consist of 
organizations sufficiently small to maintain the constructive patterns of interaction that 
the previous section described and that include local people, so that they grow in their 
ability to exercise their agency.  
The section begins with a brief history of the principle of solidarity. Forty years 
after Rerum Novarum, in 1931 Pope Pius XI released a follow-up social encyclical 
Quadragesimo Anno in order to respond to the worldwide financial depression and rising 
gap between the rich and the poor; in it, he proposed an alternate approach to organizing 
social structures in contrast to both liberal individualism and communist or fascist 
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collectivism.22 Pius XI proposes a way to measure social welfare based on the situation of 
workers: 
For then only will the social economy be rightly established and attain its 
purposes when all and each are supplied with all the goods that the wealth 
and resources of nature, technical achievement, and the social organization 
of economic life can furnish. And these goods ought indeed to be enough 
both to meet the demands of necessity and decent comfort and to advance 
people to that happier and fuller condition of life which, when it is wisely 
cared for, is not only no hindrance to virtue but helps it greatly (75). 
In his view, social welfare demands the satisfaction of basic needs but encompasses more 
than these needs, for ultimately material goods serve only as a means to spiritual 
fulfillment. 
After commenting on the economic situation of individuals, Pius XI turns to the 
“reform of institutions” and the “correction of morals” (77). For the first time in CST, the 
phrase “social justice” appears, which he links to the common good. At the individual 
level, social justice demands that “one class is forbidden from excluding the other from 
sharing in its benefits” (57), but in addition “the institutions themselves of peoples and, 
particularly those of all social life, ought to be penetrated with this justice” (88).  In 
particular, the State must enforce in concrete terms the requirements of the common good 
in a particular context (49). It should not, however, do more than necessary; rather it 
ought to “let subordinate groups handle matters and concerns of lesser importance, which 
would otherwise dissipate its efforts” (80). Pius XI calls this principle the “subsidiarity 
function” of the State. 
In the Politics, Aristotle as well considers the optimal size of a State (1326a5-
b26).23 Like Pius XI, he reasons from the principle of order: “experience shows that a 
																																																								





very populous city can rarely, if ever, be well governed; since all cities which have a 
reputation for good government have a limit of population” (1326a5).  Good government 
requires not only a manageable size for the one governing, but also a depth of 
interpersonal relationship among the citizens: “if the citizens of a state are to judge and to 
distribute offices according to merit, then they must know each other’s characters” 
(1326b15). Thus, he concludes that “the best limit of the population of a state is the 
largest number which suffices for the purposes of life, and can be taken in at a single 
view” (1326b25). The “single view” echoes back to the agora, the democratic assembly 
by which citizens governed the polis in Athenian democracy. 
The Chilean development economist Manfred Max-Neef builds on Aristotle’s 
notion of government at a manageable scale as he proposes an alternate paradigm to 
international development that he denotes “barefoot economics.” He identifies four 
problems with prevailing paradigms of international development:24  
1) our unlimited admiration for giantism and ‘big’ solutions;  
2) our obsession with abstract measurements and quantifiers;  
3) our mechanistic approach to the solution of economic problems;  
4) our tendency to oversimplify, as reflected by our efforts to favor an 
assumed ‘technical objectivity’ at the expense of losing a moral vision, a 
sense of history and a feeling for social complexity.  
Max-Neef regards as crucial the “active participation of the rural population in the 
development process”; instead of confrontation between outside experts and the local 
population, he seeks to place local populations from different regions in dialogue with 
one another.25 
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Pius XI does not use the language of development, but rather of “reconstructing 
the social order” so that “the conflict between the hostile classes be abolished and the 
harmonious cooperation of the Industries and Professions be encouraged and promoted” 
(81). To this end, he promotes associations that occupy a middle level between the 
individual and the State:  
just as inhabitants of a town are wont to found associations with the widest 
diversity of purposes, which each is quite free to join or not, so those 
engaged in the same industry or profession will combine with one another 
into associations equally free for purposes connected in some manner with 
the pursuit of the calling itself (QA 87). 
These associations echo the previous discussion in this chapter of social capital and the 
decline in American civil participation that Robert Putnam and others have highlighted. 
Depending on the commentator, they also evoke nostalgia for the medieval guild system, 
endorsement of worker-owned cooperatives as an alternative to capitalism, or support for 
labor unions.26 For the moment, this section argues that they represent common ground 
with Max-Neef’s support for economic development at a “human scale” and his practice 
of putting villages in dialogue with one another. In both cases, local people increase their 
agency and participate in their own development through small organizations.  
Uncharacteristic for an economist, a sophisticated philosophical anthropology 
underlies Max-Neef’s proposal. Instead of magnitude as the sole aim of economic growth, 
“increasing the size of the pie so that each person receives more,” he proposes to consider 
demography as well by introducing a measure of the ecological impact of each person’s 
life. Human beings must not live out an antagonistic relationship with either one another 
or their environment; rather, development must encourage a relationship of 
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interdependence with both. Like the solidarity that the previous section touched on, this 
interdependence requires development projects of a certain scale, no larger, and no 
smaller, and nature can teach us about this scale, he argues.27 
 Based on this firsthand experience, Max-Neef rejects nationalized development 
projects that do not address the “structural problems” that account for the poverty of 
“invisible people,” primarily “exploitative” employment relationships that remain despite 
interventions to modernize agricultural practice and increase efficiency. Instead, he 
would rather teach the poor how to circumvent the national order themselves, in words 
that echo those of Pius XI above: 
If national systems have learned to circumvent the poor, it is the turn of 
the poor to learn how to circumvent the national systems. This is what can 
be done and, in my opinion, must be done at local levels. Think small and 
act small, but in as many places as possible. Whatever cannot be achieved 
with national systems must necessarily assume the many forms of local 
self-reliance. Everything that can be done at local levels, is what should be 
done at local levels. The path, it seems to me, must go from the village to 
a global order.28 
Like Aristotle, he argues for an optimal size of a small unit, whether a self-contained 
village or a neighborhood of a large city, which allows a human being to experience a 
sense of identity and integration within a larger unit. These scenarios he calls 
“humanizing,” in contrast to the “alienating” experience of modern life lived in units so 
large that they do not foster community. Within a small enough unit, the human being 
retains a sense of agency as a person; in the larger unit, he or she feels treated like an 
object that others manipulate. Keeping units small requires that development practitioners 
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act against the unbridled search for growth, efficiency, or “economies of scale” that has 
dominated economic thinking.29 
Max-Neef’s “small scale development” fits well with Pius XI’s “Christian 
moderation.” In contrast to the “sordid love of wealth,” Pius XI proposes this “Christian 
moderation” as a solution to the poverty that he observes. Though he sanctions the 
increase in wealth for individuals and the community that comes with improved 
production, producers must see wealth as a means and not an end to the kingdom of God 
(136). The remaining two sections will ask this important question: how can this 
Christian symbol of the Kingdom of God offer guidance about how to structure more just 
economic relationships?  
The present section has examined complementary mechanisms to increase 
solidarity and social capital and thus enable effective human development. The previous 
sections argued that these aspects of social welfare serve as better metrics than 
aggregating metrics of individual welfare because they give primacy of place to 
interpersonal relationships. In this section, Aristotle’s insights about the polis as the 
group that can debate publically in the agora, Pius XI’s argument for the importance of 
associational life in industrial society, and Max-Neef’s experience putting local people in 
dialogue as an essential aspect of development practice give content to the social 
practices that can promote effective human development.  The next section explicitly 
integrates economic life into these social relationships and provides a counterexample of 






IV. Extractive Institutions and Dependent Relationships 
This section connects economic life into the general pattern of societal 
relationships that the previous sections have examined. Other eras have more easily 
recognized this connection, but the present age stands out for two reasons: 1) the 
profound influence of economic life on social relationships; 2) the double lack of 
awareness of this influence and corresponding unwillingness to evaluate economic 
transactions through a moral lens. Two resources from the Christian tradition provide the 
link: William Spohn’s account of the role of the symbol of the Kingdom of God in 
Christian ethics and Albino Barrera’s exposition of the important aspect of economic life 
as part of the domain of moral agency. This connection allows this section to apply the 
analysis of Christian social ethics to economic transactions, using Pope Benedict XVI’s 
encyclical Caritas at Veritate. Two pieces of economics literature sharpen Benedict’s 
account of the present state of affairs: Galeano’s Open Veins of Latin America and a well-
known paper on settler mortality rates by Acemoglu et. al. Both paint a sobering picture 
of the effects of five centuries of extractive development on the developing world. This 
reality motivates the spiritual practices of the final section.  
William Spohn highlights the central role of the symbol of the basileia tou theou 
(often translated “kingdom of God” or “reign of God”) in Christian ethics. On the one 
hand, it is the “image most frequently used by Jesus in the Gospels,” but on the other 
hand “every attempt to define it as a precise theological concept fails.”30 Spohn sees it as 
a “metaphorical framework” that “suspends many of the familiar ways of looking at the 
world and our own lives” in order to reveal more deeply the presence of God in our 
																																																								




everyday lives. Thus, growth in Christian discipleship requires that believers engage their 
analogical imagination, to let the many metaphors that Jesus employs to describe the 
Kingdom of God challenge them so that they come to perceive parallel situations in their 
own lives. For Spohn, Jesus’ preaching does not provide concrete directives; rather, Jesus 
“calls people to enter into the reign of God by doing the sorts of things that he did with 
the same motives.” Spohn’s mention of this imagination connects with Nussbaum and 
Barrera’s use of narrative in the previous section. Both elements fill out the philosophical 
anthropology of the rational agent, homo economicus.  
Modern commentators argue that the everyday realities that Jesus’ parables 
reshape include market interactions. Pope Benedict XVI’s encyclical Caritas et Veritate 
examines the role of charity in these market interactions, which play an important role in 
social life, especially in the context of relationships between the developing and the 
developed world. Released shortly after the global financial crisis, this encyclical offers a 
recent reflection (2008) on human development, in the same vein and at the same twenty-
year interval as John Paul II’s Solicitudo Rei Socialis (1987), which reflected on the 
legacy of Paul VI’s Populorum Progressio (1967), both of which this thesis has reviewed. 
Pope Benedict XVI indicates,  
the market is the economic institution that permits encounter between 
persons, inasmuch as they are economic subjects who make use of 
contracts to regulate their relations as they exchange goods and services of 
equivalent value between them, in order to satisfy their needs and 
desires.31 
																																																								
31 Benedict XVI, “Caritas in Veritate,” para. 35, last modified June 29, 2009, accessed 




In response to the present reality, Benedict offers a positive proposal in the form of an 
image of gift that reshapes market interactions. To appreciate his proposal, this section 
will examine the present reality from a theological and economic lens.  
Theologian-economist Barrera provides the theological lens with his work on the 
problem of scarcity and the related theological problem of theodicy: how could a good 
God create a world with the presence of unfulfilled needs, not only for luxury goods but 
also for basic necessities, in which many continue to live in poverty? In contrast to 
Thomas Malthus, who argues that scarcity and by implication the existence of poverty in 
the world form a necessary part of the human condition to motivate human beings, who 
are naturally lazy, Barrera argues that scarcity is accidental and not part of God’s plan. 
God works through it, however, as its presence invites human beings to participate in 
God’s goodness and action in the world. This participation opens the possibility for 
deeper human life than if scarcity had not existed in the first place. 
This thesis lack the space to accompany Barrera as he traces this provocative 
thesis through many branches of theology—the Old Testament, the Pauline corpus, and 
the problematic of the relationship between grace and nature within systematic 
theology—but for the present discussion we make use of his account of the Kingdom of 
God, since Spohn also argues for the relevance of that symbol for Christian ethics. Here 
Barrera argues that material sufficiency is intrinsic to the gift of creation, for God takes 
care of the birds of the air and the lilies of the field, but that human material sufficiency 
comes as a byproduct of human conduct, insofar as humans “seek first the kingdom of 
God and his righteousness and all these things will be given you besides” (Mt 6:33). In 
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other words, the poverty of the human race will only be alleviated if human beings take 
action; moreover, they will find their salvation there.   
In particular, this human conduct includes economic agency, not at an individual 
but at a communal level. Barrera emphasizes the “fundamentally relational” character of 
economic life: “wealth can confer autonomy by removing the need to depend on others; a 
finite earth requires sharing; production processes reflect a tight network of 
interdependence; economic processes spawn externalities with ripple effects.”32 Within 
this web of relationships, every action of an individual either codifies existing, often 
unjust, patterns of relationship or promotes new, just ones. The Christian tradition 
describes our relationships to one another as not contractual but covenantal, so these 
mutual obligations extend to the economic sphere, to the extent that we might have to 
“relinquish our own claims over the finite goods of the earth for the sake of others.”33 
Barrera links this relinquishment to the spirituality of the cross. Like the journey 
of faith in general, acting in this way will require repeated sacrifices. He argues that we 
cannot eliminate the presence of the cross, but we can decide “whether we are going to 
bear the cross at all or not, how well we are going to shoulder it, and how the burden-
bearing is to be apportioned.”34 In particular, we must examine whether we can lighten 
the burden borne by the poor. The subsequent two pieces of economic literature provide a 
concrete account of that burden in the legacy of European colonization. The next section 
will return to Jesus’ parables about the Kingdom of God to propose spiritual practices 
that invite us to shoulder the burden of the poor.    
																																																								
32 Albino Barrera, God and the Evil of Scarcity: Moral Foundations of Economic Agency, 
1st edition. (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 137. 




 In the Latin America context, Eduardo Galeano’s classic study provides a graphic 
account of the five centuries since the Colombian encounter.35 The title Open Veins of 
Latin America summarizes well the repeated pattern that he finds: initial plundering of 
gold and silver in the first century of European occupation, subsequent overproduction of 
export crops such as sugar, cotton, and coffee in later years; and the present use of Latin 
American manufacturing as a source of cheap labor. In his view, this history accounts for 
the continued gap between the rich and the poor: rich cities and poor countryside within 
each country, rich and poor countries on the Latin American continent, and the rich 
Global North and poor Global South. Writing in the 1970s, he predicts present debates 
about the winners and losers of globalization and free trade regimes.  
Development economist Daron Acemoglu and his colleagues also empirically 
quantify the effect of colonization in general and resource extraction in particular on 
GDP growth in 64 countries. 36  They find that differences between historic settler 
mortality rates account for 25% of the difference in per-capita GDP among 64 former 
colonies. As an explanation, they propose that that colonial powers set up qualitatively 
different institutions in these countries. In places where colonists wanted to live with low 
mortality rates like Australia, New Zealand, or the United States, they set up neo-
European institutions with strong property rights and checks on executive power; in 
places where colonists did not want to live, like Belgian Congo, they set up “extractive 
institutions” that did not value rule of law but maximized profits in the way that Galeano 
																																																								
35 Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a 
Continent, trans. Cedric Belfrage, 25th Anniversary Edition. (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1997). 
36 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” The American Economic 
Review 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369–1401. 
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describes. Surrounded by these examples of deliberately deficient development that, 
instead of improving the developing world, actually make life worse, what alternative 
approach can CST offer? 
In Caritas in Veritate, Benedict XVI proposes the virtue of solidarity in response 
to extractive relationships between the developed and developing world. Despite the 
presence of growth as a “positive factor that has lifted billions of people out of misery,” 
he remains concerned about “the malfunctions and dramatic problems” of “this same 
economic growth” that are “highlighted even further by the current crisis” (CV 21). In 
contrast to the world of Populorum Progressio, in which economic life remained within 
national boundaries, Benedict XVI addresses a world in which production of goods, 
markets for their sale, and the labor force responsible for both extend beyond national 
boundaries. As the title of the encyclical indicates, he would like to restore a notion of 
gratuitous gift within the domain of market exchange: as “a gift received by everyone, 
charity in truth is a force that builds community” and “brings all people together without 
imposing barriers or limits” (34). This respect for the Other as a gift extends as well to 
the relationship between humanity and nature and contrasts with a notion of efficiency 
that is not value-free (48).  
Thus, instead of extractive patterns of development, in which one group takes 
advantage of another, Benedict proposes, “the development of peoples depends, above all, 
on a recognition that the human race is a single family working together in true 
communion” (53). To achieve this model, we must deepen our understanding and 
appreciation of the relationships between people. On a practical level, instead of 
development aid, Benedict’s proposal challenges us to open the markets of the developed 
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world to the products of the developing world (58), for purchasing is always a moral act 
(66). On a spiritual level, he challenges us to deepen our understanding of the 
relationships between people and to take into account the spiritual and not only economic 
welfare of the whole human race (76). Both steps call us to replace unequal economic 
relationships built on dependency with authentically human relationships of mutual 
flourishing. The spiritual practices of the following section provide a concrete way to 
enact his challenging but necessary proposal. As this chapter has argued, social welfare 
depends on individual action.  
 
V. Authentic Development as Mutual Growth in Vulnerability 
This final section proposes two spiritual practices that provide the necessary 
conditions for effective economic development. The chapter began with the traditional 
economic account of social welfare as aggregate individual welfare and argued that the 
structure of individual solidarity and group social capital provide a deeper measure of 
social welfare than this account. The insight of game theory about patterns of social 
interaction that enhance social capital motivated the subsequent section about 
associational life and small-scale development. The task of development came into focus: 
restructuring patterns of relationships in community. Benedict XVI and Barrera provided 
grounding to consider economic dimensions of these relationships as constitutive. In turn, 
Galleano and Acemoglu et. al. provided a vivid image of extractive relationships that 
perpetuate cycles of dependency.  
With this descriptive groundwork, this section explicitly addresses the normative 
task. Building on the previous sections, which has highlighted the key role of individual 
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interpersonal relationships as determinants of social welfare, it proposes human 
development as depth in vulnerability and relationship, for both parties as equals. The 
consequences of individual relationships radiate outward in profound ways. Acemoglu 
showed how individual preferences of European settlers three hundred years ago 
contributed significantly to present global poverty. Benedict shows that present 
individual consumer preferences affect global trade. Thus, improving social welfare 
requires reshaping these interpersonal relationships. The practices that this section 
proposes aim to do just that: meditation on the Kingdom of God and the practice of 
Eucharist.   
We provide a very brief account of how both practices function. 37 The previous 
chapter began with the importance of personal encounter for all of the thinkers of this 
thesis, secular and religious. Nussbaum and Barrera argue that this encounter takes place 
in narrative form: two individuals, perhaps in different social or economic situations, 
touch each other at particular instance of their own story. How each treats the other 
depends on their patterns of behavior, which are conditioned by their life experiences up 
until that point. Spohn proposes the “analogical imagination” as the means by which the 
reader of a parable bridges the reality of the text and the reality of their lives to allow the 
text to invite them to transform these patterns of behavior.  
As a representative example of a parable about the Kingdom of God, Spohn 
examines the “classic New Testament collision” between “life as fairness versus life as 
																																																								
37 Spohn devotes Go And Do Likewise to a systematic account of the moral life that 
integrates Christian spirituality, Scripture, and ethics, which this thesis employs here. The 
method is not Christian but the content is. Other stories from other religious traditions 
could invite the practitioner to the same transformation or quite a different one. This 
thesis lacks the space to explore this possibility further.  
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grace” in the parable of the Workers in the Vineyard (Mt 20:1-16).38 In the parable, we 
recall, a landowner goes out several times throughout the day to hire workers for his 
vineyard, but at the end of the day, pays each of them the same wage, regardless of how 
much of the day they have worked.  
In Spohn’s view, the parable challenges the listener who sees God’s reign as a 
“ladder that rewards the ambitious climber.” We could include in this category those 
members of the developed world who feel as if they have earned the riches they possess. 
It cuts deeply at their notion of fairness that “people should get what they deserve” and 
prompts the question: doesn’t sharing what they have undercut their accomplishment? 
Rather than fairness, Jesus would like to highlight God’s generosity, to which Barrera 
referred earlier, for “our imaginations have to be retooled drastically to make sense out of 
a world of such cosmic generosity.” 
The moral vision of this parable offers salvation to its privileged listeners as well. 
If they can recognize God’s generosity in their lives of others in their time of need, 
perhaps they can come to recognize God’s generosity in their own lives in their time of 
need. From a secular perspective, Nussbaum argues that the pursuit of the good life 
necessarily includes exposure to the vulnerability of relationships and the risk associated 
with action in this world.39 This common human experience of vulnerability unites the 
members of the developing and developed world. In a Christian key, it lays the 
groundwork for an encounter in solidarity that invites both parties to grow in their agency.  
																																																								
38 Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 103–6. 
39 Nussbaum uses the classical tradition to highlight similar themes that Spohn finds in 
the Christian tradition in Martha C Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness Luck and 
Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011). 
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In the Christian tradition, the practice of the Eucharist encompasses both 
individual identity and communal formation. As Spohn points out, however, in the 
tradition systematic theologians have spent more time analyzing the nature of the 
transformation of the bread and wine than ethicists have spent exploring the implications 
of Eucharist as a practice.40 Against a “therapeutic and consumerist culture,” he argues, 
Christians must fight the tendency to reduce the Eucharist to a mere technique but let it 
invite them to mercy both inside the community, in the form of forgiveness, and outside 
the community, in the form of solidarity with the poor.  
Like Jesus’ parables of the Kingdom of God, these practices touch on the 
relational core at the heart of individual identity that this chapter on social welfare has 
examined in various ways. The Synoptic Gospels’ account of the Eucharist begins when 
Jesus chooses to identify with the hunger of his disciples, a hunger for a more just world 
to which the Passover Seder points. In turn, He invites them to a deep identification with 
his life and mission in the form of a covenantal meal, which He instructs them to 
celebrate in His memory. Moreover, in the Johannine account of the Eucharist, the moral 
exemplar Jesus performs a humble act of service by washing the feet of the disciples, 
including the feet of the one Judas who will betray him, before enjoining them to do the 
same. He demonstrates vulnerable service, unites his disciples in their experience of it, 
and calls them to serve one another and others in the same way. 
The early Christian community understood Eucharist not as an individual 
religious practice but as a holistic and collective way of living that included economic 
dimensions. Moreover, as Paul’s letters testify, members of this community recognized 
																																																								
40 Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 175–84.	
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and exercised a diversity of gifts as they grew in the life of faith. Thus we propose 
Eucharist as a second practice. Along with the parables of the Kingdom of God, it 
provides both a metric to evaluate social welfare and practice to strengthen it. 
 
VI. Summary 
This chapter set out to examine five aspects of social welfare that complement the 
previous chapter’s five aspects of individual welfare. Like that chapter, it employed 
resources from political philosophy and the development economics literature in dialogue 
with Catholic Social Teaching. The first section began by examining Amartya Sen’s 
proceduralist approach to calculating social welfare, which though it pointed towards 
imagining oneself in the place of the other, does not value human relationships as an 
intrinsic part of flourishing. Next it considered CST’s thick but abstract notion of the 
common good and Albino Barrera’s attempt to concretize it into policy recommendations. 
In the second section, both CST’s treatment of solidarity and social science work 
on social capital indicated the intrinsic importance of human relationships, and the 
method of game theory provided an analytic tool to understand how the micro level 
affects the macro level. Moreover, in the third section, recent literature on small-scale 
development and the place of subsidiarity in CST revealed that these relationships 
flourish best in communities of a certain size. Having established the importance of these 
relationships, the fourth section turned to their characteristics. Work in Latin American 
dependency theory echoes concerns by Pope Benedict about situations of inequality and 
dependency, on local and global levels.  
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The final section proposed two symbols as resources from the Christian tradition. 
First Jesus’ use of the Kingdom of God offers a way to reimagine these relationships, in a 
way that offers salvation not only for the underdeveloped but also for the developed, by 
revealing the gratuitous response of God to the universal experience of human 
vulnerability. Second, the Eucharist intensifies this experience of God’s response to 
vulnerability, builds a community around it, and missions community members to 
practice it both inside and outside the community, in all areas of life, including economic 
ones. Thus both symbols offer a metric to judge the effectiveness of economic 
development projects and a practice to improve them.  
One potential critique of these practices is that they would not resonate in a 
pluralistic context. This chapter concludes with two preliminary responses to this 
criticism. First, the final section proposes mutual growth in vulnerability as an important 
aspect of social welfare and these symbols as particular instantiations of this aspect. 
Additional symbols or stories from other religious traditions or even secular traditions 
like Nussbaum’s use of the classical tradition could provide the same effect. Both the 
previous chapter and the present one employed both Christian and secular sources in each 
aspect in the hope to build an overlapping consensus, and this approach applies to the 
final section.  
Second, Christian and Catholic symbols have exerted considerable moral 
influence in the history of international development since World War II. Christian 
thought influenced the drafting of the UN Charter on Human Rights. John Paul II’s many 
international trips and public appearances solidified his role as a moral actor during and 
after the Cold War. More recently, the charismatic appeal of Francis both inside and 
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outside of Catholic circles illustrates the enduring power of these transformative symbols. 
We ought not prematurely rob them of their motivating power. The conclusion returns to 






This thesis proposed normative criteria for evaluating the impact of economic 
development programs. The introduction presented the situation of indigenous coffee 
growers in Chiapas, Mexico and three possible approaches to help them: conditional cash 
transfers, fair trade coffee, and value chain reform. Each approach addressed a different 
part of their reality, but no easy method allowed for the possibility of comparing their 
effectiveness.  
The first chapter identified two structural features responsible for their poverty—
their lack of control over land tenure and the international coffee market. Next, it 
demonstrated the lack of normative resources in the history of international development. 
Looking outside the discipline, it located resources in two other fields—capability theory 
from secular political philosophy and Catholic Social Teaching on international 
development. With these resources in hand, it specified the task of the thesis: develop 
normative criteria for evaluating international development projects. 
The second chapter examined five aspects of individual welfare: human dignity, 
political rights, socio-economic rights, internal goods, and agency. Its exposition revealed 
their interrelatedness as it gradually touched on all areas of human life: external 
conditions like political and socio-economic rights as well as internal conditions like 
internal goods and agency. A unified theme ran through all of these aspects of individual 
welfare: the importance of personal encounter with another human being in his practical 
reason and sociability. As the final element of agency summarized, development requires 
the presence of all of the elements necessary for him to work out his own life in a social 
context. Nevertheless, the incomplete nature of the picture of human life presented by 
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these measures of individual welfare also came into focus. Individual welfare was only 
part of the story. 
In response, the third chapter examined five aspects of social welfare. The first 
and second section considered methodological questions about measuring social welfare. 
They rejected aggregation of individual welfare measures in a social welfare measure in 
favor of a game theoretic analysis of the effect of individual interactions on social norms. 
The third section used these results to justify the importance of social structures that 
facilitate not anonymous but human interactions. Solidarity at the individual level 
grounds social capital at the societal level. Applying these results to the economic 
dimension of relationships, the fourth section specifies extractive and dependent social 
structures that do not contribute to development. In response, the fifth section proposes 
two resources from the Christian tradition that serve as norms and practices for social 
welfare: the Kingdom of God and the Eucharist. It argues that though these resources 
employ religious language they function as well in the sphere of public reason. 
This conclusion will briefly return to the Chiapas context of the introduction in 
order to apply these aspects of individual and social welfare to the three approaches that 
it examined. A vast literature exists on all three approaches, and space prevents any more 
than a cursory analysis. Yet even the brief social analysis below proposes a qualitatively 
different approach than the economics literature that is grounded in theological reflection, 





Conditional Cash Transfers 
 Under the Progresa-Oportunidades program of the Mexican government, the first 
CCT program to be quantitatively evaluated and a model for similar programs in more 
than 20 countries around the world, recipients receive three related aids: nutritional 
supplements, cash payments for attending health checkups, and cash payments for 
sending their children to school.1  
 We first examine this program under the criteria of individual welfare. CCTs 
work by addressing multiple dimensions of poverty in a straightforward way by 
incentivizing in the short-term investments in human capital that will pay off in the long 
term. 2  The cash payments of Progresa-Oportunidades concretely guarantee socio-
economic rights like education and health care. The effects of better nutrition, higher 
educational attainment, and improved health may also mitigate the particular internal 
heterogeneities that can prevent rural households from taking full advantage of their 
resources. Moreover, CCTs respect individual agency. Instead of a patchwork of in-kind 
social programs like food supplements, the freedom of conditional cash transfers trusts 
individual households to use the money for their own needs. They fall short, however, 
under the criteria of political rights. In the Mexican context, they enable a cycle of 
dependency on the government and do not deal with the corruption or violence that 
plagues many parts of the country.   
																																																								
1	An overview of the history of the implementation of the program and the major results 
can be found in this work by one of its authors: Santiago Levy, Progress against Poverty: 
Sustaining Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades Program (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Intitution Press, 2006).	
2	Laura B. Rawlings and Gloria M. Rubio, “Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash 
Transfer Programs,” The World Bank Research Observer 20, no. 1 (Spring 2005) (March 
1, 2005): 29–55.	
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 Next we examine this program under the criteria of social welfare. If we measure 
aggregate individual welfare, it improves social welfare because of the exogenous 
infusion of capital in a particular region, but the anonymous way that it operates as a 
national program does not improve social capital or facilitate solidarity among the 
individual recipients of the program. Other Mexican government programs work 
differently. For example, under the DICONSA program, a village agricultural council can 
open a local store for food staples that receives government subsidies but retains local 
autonomy.3 This program addresses one of the same needs of Progresa while also 
cultivating local social capital. Thus CCTs do not fare well under the metric of 
subsidiarity.  
Nor do they address the issue of dependent relationships: either of the coffee 
growers in the developing world to the coffee buyers in the developed or the indigenous 
in rural Mexico to the Mexican government. Mission employees in Chiapas report that on 
the day the cash payments arrive, the recipients come to the country seat to withdraw the 
money and vendors of all sorts line the street. Within hours, the months’ payment is spent 
in the town square, with the mission church as the backdrop. Laden with goods, the 
indigenous disappear until the same day the following month. This image resembles far 
more the encounter of Jesus with the moneylenders in the Temple than any parable of the 





3	Jonathan Fox, Accountability Politics: Power and Voice in Rural Mexico (New York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 2007).	
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Fair Trade 
Under the regime of fair trade, coffee processing companies in the developed 
world voluntarily pay a higher-than-market price for their coffee, the “fair trade premium.” 
In order to participate in fair trade, coffee cooperatives must pass certification around 
labor practices and environmental standards. This “fair trade premium” remains within 
the local community and often goes towards community development projects.4   
We first examine fair trade using the criteria of individual welfare. In terms of 
human dignity, fair trade represents an improvement over non-fair trade because the 
single origin coffee comes from one community and the coffee usually gives the name 
and possibly the story of the community. A consumer in the developed world can read 
about the coffee farmer in the developing world on a website or a product package. The 
“fair trade premium” might fund projects in the local community that support political or 
socio-economic rights, such as voter registration, education, or health care, and then 
projects might in turn affect internal goods. The tremendous variety of fair trade projects 
makes it difficult to generalize. Moreover, fair trade projects do not really allow coffee 
farmers to increase their agency, however, as they do not provide them with other 
economic opportunities than growing coffee.  
Next we turn to social welfare. If we consider social welfare as purely the 
aggregate of individual welfare, then fair trade might not improve social welfare. 
Literature on fair trade has suggested that coffee farmers might not receive more income 
because the “fair trade premium” absorbs additional costs of certification. In communities 
																																																								
4	Raluca E. Dragusanu, Daniele Giovannucci, and Nathan Nunn, “The Economics of Fair 
Trade,” Working Paper (National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2014), 
https://doi.org/10.3386/w20357.	
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with fair trade and non-fair trade coffee producers, the benefits of programs funded by 
fair trade premiums could spill over to non-fair trade producers in the same communities.  
If we examine social welfare instead in terms of solidarity and social capital, we 
can argue that cooperatives offer a promising way for the coffee farmers in a region to 
develop the capacity to trust one another as they share knowledge about coffee 
production techniques and market their coffee together. Worker cooperatives of a 
different form in industrial Europe motivated CST on solidarity, and a century later these 
coffee cooperatives provide examples of the sort of associational life that strengthens 
social capital. Moreover, if coffee farmers also hold leadership roles in these 
organizations and members from different cooperatives gather to share best practices and 
form regional or national coffee associations, then these meetings could serve as 
examples of small-scale development. The fair trade movement split in 2012, however; 
one faction allows industrial-scale producers to join, while the other does not.5 This thesis 
would argue that smaller cooperatives facilitate social welfare better.   
Still, coffee cooperatives do not address the issue of dependent relationships or 
extractive patterns of development. In all fair trade systems, coffee farmers in the 
developing world sell green coffee beans, the raw material and not the finished product, 
at a price that they do not control. What about the final criteria of the Kingdom of God 
and Eucharist? The fair trade movement began as a religious movement, and religious 
organizations from the developing world developed local relationships with coffee 
producers to help them adopt fair trade certification and market their products. To the 
																																																								
5	Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO) favors small producers, while 
Fair Trade USA would like to include large producers as well. The previously cited 
Dragusanu et. al 2014 article provides the complete story.	
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extent that groups from the developing world maintain close relationships with their local 
partners, these relationships can facilitate encounters of solidarity like meditating on the 
Kingdom. Jesus’ comments in the gospels suggest an even deeper question: if coffee 
growers from the developing world ever visit the coffee shops in the developed world 
where their coffee is consumed and have their patrons serve them. The reversal of roles 
and image of service would truly incarnate the Eucharist, both in the meal of the Last 
Supper and the washing of the feet.  
 
Value Chain Reform  
The coffee cooperative Ts’umbal Xitalha’, which is sponsored by the Jesuit 
mission of Bachajón, offers membership to any local coffee grower who agrees to sell 
exclusively to the cooperative and adopt organic farming practices within three years. It 
accompanies its members throughout the growing season with quality assurance and 
technical expertise and buys their entire coffee harvest at the end of the season for a per-
kilo price set by the cooperative board. At the end of each year, the surplus income of the 
cooperative goes into a community bank that gives low-interest loans to cooperative 
members using their coffee harvest as collateral.   
We first examine the coffee cooperative in terms of individual welfare. Since 
1958, the Jesuit mission has played an important role in mounting various projects, each 
at the initiative of local peoples. In 1992, it spun off an associated NGO, CEDIAC 
(Centro de Derechos Indigenas). At present, CEDIAC is mounting a voter registration 
drive among the indigenous in advance of the upcoming local, state, and federal elections 
on July 1, 2018. The mission sponsors a variety of workshops (talleres) about educational, 
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health, and other topics at its training center (colegio). Another ongoing initiative is 
consolidating and evaluating the many programs that work with indigenous women. Thus, 
considered along with the other 27 programs of the mission, the coffee cooperative 
improves individual welfare across the metrics of political rights, socio-economic rights, 
and internal goods.  
Crucially, the programs of the Jesuit mission increase agency in a way that fair 
trade and CCTs do not. The Jesuits arrived in 1958 at the invitation of the indigenous, 
and each program has started at the suggestion of the indigenous in response to their 
present needs: an indigenous deacon program, a coffee cooperative, or a community bank. 
The mission’s organizational chart shows that at each level mestizos (non-indigenous) 
and indigenous share oversight responsibility. Recently, some indigenous have left the 
community for university training so they can return and start their own projects.  
Next, we examine the coffee cooperative in terms of social welfare, aided by a 
recent quantitative study of 600 Tseltal families that includes both cooperative members 
and non-members.6 As one caveat to the naive metric of social welfare as aggregate 
individual welfare, we note that preliminary results from this study indicate that the 
coffee cooperative does not meet its stated objective of increasing the per-kilo price that 
members receive for their coffee. One possible reason comes from differences in market 
structure between the cooperative and the local coffee buyers. The cooperative board sets 
a per-kilo price for green coffee beans once a year for the entire seven-county region. In 
contrast, local coffee buyers charge a price that varies by season and distance from a 
																																																								
6	Stephen Pitts, “Impact of Cooperative Membership on Members’ Household 
Economies: The Case of Chiapas Coffee Farmers” (University of San Francisco, 2018).	
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population center. Thus, selling to the cooperative does not always represent an economic 
gain for the coffee producer, depending on the time of the year and his location.  
Nevertheless, the mission offers a guaranteed market; results from that same study 
indicate an increase of 20% in the amount of the coffee harvest that members can sell 
compared to non-members. This increase is reflected in an increase in coffee sales per 
hectare cultivated, but not in other aspects of income: coffee sales, agricultural, non-
agricultural, or overall income. The lack of increase may come as a result of different 
preferences of the coffee farmers. Instead of more income, they value guaranteed income. 
The Chiapas context contains an unusually high amount of natural social capital. 
The study proposes that individuals align themselves with one of three sources: the 
Mexican government, grassroots organizations like the Zapatistas, or the Jesuit mission. 
Cooperative participation is positively correlated with participation in other popular 
movements or mission programs and negatively correlated with political activism and the 
presence of a DICONSA store above in the respondent’s village. Moreover, the one 
measure of income that declines as a result of cooperative participation is recipient of 
benefits from Progresa-Oportunidades above, even though the one does not preclude the 
other. Thus, like religious organizations in other contexts, the cooperative enhances the 
effect of the stock of social capital that the Jesuit mission has cultivated.7 
Like the fair trade cooperative above, this cooperative also enhances social 
welfare through the principle of subsidiarity, since the cooperative works as an 
association. Following indigenous governance practice, most decisions are made by 
																																																								
7 John Coleman, “Religious Social Capital: Its Nature, Social Location, and Limits,” in 
Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good, ed. Corwin Smidt (Waco, TX: 
Baylor University Press, 2003), 33–47. 
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consensus in monthly council meetings or yearly assemblies that call to mind the 
Athenian polis. In addition, unlike the other two interventions this thesis considers, it 
directly addresses both of the structural issues that contribute to the poverty of the Tseltal 
coffee growers. First, it is the only example of a coffee cooperative in Chiapas that 
locally produces roasted, packaged coffee, a finished product for export. Second, it 
continues to advocate for the land rights of the local people. Work by Catholic 
organizations in local communities contributed to the 1994 Zapatista uprising.8  Thus, it 
offers an alternative to the extractive, dependent relationships that characterize much of 
the international coffee value chain.  
At the 15-year anniversary of the coffee cooperative, more work remains, 
especially involving the conflict between the continual desire for profit and expansion of 
the market economy that provides the customer base for the cooperative and the 
indigenous preference for social harmony. The constant flow of visitors and volunteers 
from within and outside Mexico testify to the transforming power of short visits and 
long-term stays. Also, the small size of the cooperative, the source of its power and the 
reason that it has escaped notice from the multinationals that control the Chiapas coffee 
market, poses disadvantages as well. It suffers from the precarious social fabric that has 
grown even more fragile in the lead-up to the elections. Yet Jesus beckons as well: the 




8 Sarah Washbrook, “The Chiapas Uprising of 1994: Historical Antecendents and 
Political Consequences,” in Rural Chiapas Ten Years after the Zapatista Uprising, The 
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